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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes a framework, a component of a 
larger paradigm, designed to improve the thinking, 
planning, and acting of individuals within society. It is 
based upon factors of human existence that most can agree 
are fundamental to pursuing matters of importance, however 
disparately we may see them. Assuming that human choice is 
a function of consciousness and compassion— it argues that 
insight from ethics and policy studies can be improved if 
founded upon an understanding of the implications of the 
full development and use of the essential human capacities 
that underlie consciousness and compassion: critical and 
creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; 
and cooperating in inquiry and action. It argues that for 
any ethical or policy judgment to be "essentially human" it 
must both employ the essential human capacities of all 
those involved or affected and account for its impact upon 
those capacities, as far as is reasonably possible.
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PREFACE
There is a certain risk of confusion inherent in 
what follows, which I should like to minimize through these 
comments.
Thesis as Part of a Broader Model
The purpose of this thesis is to develop and 
demonstrate a framework for achieving understanding, 
discovering questions, solving problems, and resolving 
conflicts as a process tending toward a well-considered, 
comprehensive and coherent product, or "Quality Judgment." 
This process, which I call an "Essentially Human Judgment 
Process," may also be called "Quality Judgment" in the 
sense that it is a product as well as a process. In any 
event, both process and product are but parts, though 
fundamental ones, of a broader model for ethics and policy 
study, which I call "Vision & Value-based Excellence" or, 
in its most robust form, the Essential Transconnection 
Paradigm. This paradigm, in turn, is based upon a number 
of assumptions, one of which relates to a fundamental world 
view, which I call "An Evolving World Ethic."
The risk of confusion arises from the fact that 
this framework is described here independently of the
vii
broader contextual model. As a result, it may appear at 
first glance to be incomplete. This incompleteness is 
there by necessity. Unlike the more comprehensive nature 
of the more robust paradigm, the intent of the thesis is to 
build the minimally sufficient framework for a frame of 
reference employing, reflecting, and considering that which 
is essentially human.
As such, it is a meta-ethical, meta-political 
framework that is pre-constitution, pre-law, pre­
principles, and pre-values. That is not to say that it is 
itself value-neutral. It might be accurate to say that the 
framework describes the values behind the values; the 
principles employed within the frame of reference as 
algorithms or heuristics are those dictated by the context, 
history, and relationships of those involved and affected 
by it. So, provided the framework is employed, it makes no 
difference what the actual purposes, visions, values or 
views of reality of all those involved and affected are.
It is only "of the essence" that they be well-considered 
and that due weight is given to how well-formed they are.
Both the notions of "Vision & Value-based 
Excellence" and an "Essentially Human Judgment Process" are 
born of a quest for understanding my own life experiences, 
especially service during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, 
practice as an attorney and businessman, and loves won and 
lost. The notion of a judgment being of "Quality" was
viii
suggested by Daniel Yankelovich in his book Coming to 
Public Judgment. With the goal of trying to determine what 
a "Quality Public Judgment" would look like, the model, of 
which this thesis is a part, took shape. Thus, the working 
title of a work in progress developing the Essential 
Transconnection Paradigm is Quality Public Judgment: 
Discussion, Dialogue, and Inquiry in Ethics and Policy.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS
In the final, and most abstract, analysis, all 
ethical and policy judgments are concerned with notions of 
what is good, true, and beautiful for an individual, group, 
or community. More concretely, human action is a function 
of visions of a desired future, views of reality, and 
expectations as to the possibilities of action that must be 
well-formed for any individual or group or community to 
achieve their aims consistently. That is, visions of a 
desired future must be challenging, integrating, and 
achievable, lest lives be filled with apathy, missed 
opportunity, or failure. Views of reality must be 
comprehensive, sustaining, and accurate, lest lives be 
filled with unpleasant surprises, passivity, and wasted 
energy. Expectations as to the possibilities of action 
must permit anticipation, innovation, and excellence (see 
Barker 1992, 11-13, 139), lest lives be at the power of
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events, mired in the solutions of the past. In short, if 
visions, views, and expectations are not well-formed, 
neither individual nor group nor community can consistently 
achieve the good, the true, and the beautiful in life.
Essential to developing any such vision, view, or
expectation is a well-developed perspective— the faculty of 
seeing all relevant data, concepts, and valuations in a 
meaningful relationship, one to another. All individuals 
(regardless of perspective), however, think, plan, and act 
as parts of wholes that are themselves parts of greater 
wholes. Our thought processes, our languages, and our
habits, customs, and traditions are all of the essence, at
one and the same time, of both the part and the whole.
This suggests that there might be some set of concepts that 
all policy makers and analysts can accept as fundamental to 
good public policy— the procedural values behind the 
substantive values, as it were. So, taken together, these 
suggest that any person or group striving to make well- 
formed ethical or policy judgments must take into account 
the we11-developed perspectives of all those involved in, 
or affected by, the judgment.
The purpose of this thesis, then, is to develop and 
demonstrate the concept that a framework employing the 
well-developed perspectives of all persons affected by a 
judgment is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition 
for any individual or group to reach and implement 
judgments of quality effectively and efficiently. As such,
it proposes a relatively simple conceptual framework to 
bring into play all the human perspectives that together 
constitute human reality when thinking, planning and acting 
for ethical and policy purposes. It is designed to be 
fundamental to any system, principle, or model that one 
would employ for ethical and policy decision-making. Thus, 
if one would employ principles of justice (however defined) 
or caring or utility, the concepts developed herein ought 
to be employed in acting on, and arguing from, those 
principles. Moreover, these concepts ought to be employed 
ab initio in deciding whether to adopt those principles.
This framework, together with the chosen set 
principles, etc., would constitute a frame of reference 
that one would employ in making ethical and policy 
judgments— a structure of views of reality, symbols and 
concepts, and valuations and values by means of which an 
individual, group, or community perceives or evaluates 
data, communicates ideas, and regulates behavior. Its goal 
is insight into, and understanding of, the diverse 
perspectives that make up our world as a means to truth 
(see Lipman 1988, 148; Sleinis 1994, Chap. 2).
Since it is designed to discover relevant 
principles or apply adopted principles, the concepts 
developed here are value-neutral as to what judgments 
should be reached. This is not to say that it is itself 
value-neutral. It is to say that the values are embedded 
in the framework itself, from which other values may be
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inferred, not as judgments, but as necessary conditions.
It is, in this sense, meta-ethical, meta-political, that 
is, pre-constitution, pre-law, pre-principles, and pre­
values .
It is designed to be fundamental to action and 
argument, whatever the actor's ends-in-view or standards, 
criteria, principles, or values. Hence, its approach is 
meta-ethical. It assumes that— whether the actor values 
fairness or justice or caring; whether he or she orders his 
or her affairs according to a theory of social contract or 
rationally developed duty or virtue ethic; and whatever his 
or her notion of beauty— consistently achieving his or her 
ends-in-view over a lifetime requires that certain human 
attributes and capacities be developed, maintained, and 
employed for him or her to act and argue from a foundation 
of truth. Thus, if one wants to be just or pursue 'the 
greatest good for the greatest number' or care for all 
those deserving of care or fulfill a social contract that 
might have been developed behind a veil of ignorance, I 
assume that there are certain aspects of humanity, which 
all or most of us can agree, are necessary to do or argue 
well.
Essential Human Attributes
Life of the human being is characterized by action 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098al6-17; Mises 1966, chap. 1) 
and argument (Hoppe 1993, 152-56; see, e.g., Nicomachean
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Ethics). Human choice is a function of both (see 
Nicomachean Ethics 1.2.1112al7, 6.2.1139a31-34; Owens 1991; 
Mises 1966, 12-13; Hoppe 1993, 180-81). Consciousness and 
compassion are components of choice. If, taken together, 
choice, consciousness and compassion are considered to be 
essential^ human attributes, how does one develop, 
maintain, and employ one's essential human attributes such 
that one acts and argues well? That is, how does one 
expand one's consciousness such that one is able to make 
better choices of, and deal more appropriately with, the 
objects of one's compassion— all with a view to creating 
the life one truly desires to live (see Senge 1992).
Human Choice 
Human choice is a fundamental attribute of the 
human being; it has been recognized as such at least since 
the ancient Greeks (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 
3.2.Illlb4-1112al8) It is, in the words of Ludwig von 
Mises (1966), "a person's conscious adjustment to the state 
of the universe that determines his life" (11).
In this thesis, I follow Aristotle in distinguishing 
a choice from opinion (Nicomachean Ethics 3.2.llllbll-12). 
As Aristotle observed, "anything may be a matter of 
opinion— we form opinions about what is eternal, or 
impossible, just as much as what is within our power 
(3.1.llllb31-33). As he observed, people themselves 
differ, some excelling at choosing, others at opining. I
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also join Aristotle, who concludes that choice is 
"voluntary action preceded by deliberation, since choice 
involves reasoning and some process of thought"
(3.2.1112al4-17).
Human life is an unceasing sequence of choosing 
among various opportunities seen to be available to the 
choosing individual that results in a linked chain of 
actions (Mises 1966, 45). Human choice itself is largely a 
function of consciousness, specifically the attention we 
pay to the situation before us: what we see and feel, what 
we value, what relationships we recognize (Csikszentmihalyi 
1991, 33). Thus, deliberation leading to choice must have 
some we11-developed input in the form of data, concepts, 
and valuations to lead to effective and efficient 
judgments, arguments, and actions.
Human Consciousness 
The notion of human consciousness, however, defies 
easy definition. Following Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1991), 
this thesis takes a phenomenological approach to 
consciousness, defining it as intentionally ordered 
information. Consciousness gives us the capacity to become 
aware of ourselves, the capacity to learn and grow, the 
capacity to imagine a future, the capacity to change the 
world. It allows us to choose to act in, rather than 
merely react or adapt to, the world surrounding us.
Human consciousness provides the fundamental
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knowledge and understanding that the human being employs in 
making choices and acting. "Some people learn to use this 
priceless resource efficiently," Csikszentmihalyi (1991) 
declares, "while others waste it." He observes that:
The mark of a person who is in control of consciousness 
is the ability to focus attention at will, to be 
oblivious to distractions, to concentrate for as long 
as it takes to achieve a goal, and not longer. And the 
person who can do this usually enjoys the normal course 
of everyday life. (31)
Csikszentmihalyi (1993) concludes that, in addition to
chance and necessity, "Consciousness, this third
determinant of our behavior, can lead to safety or to
destruction" (15). Consciousness, then, must be well-
developed, maintained, and employed for judgments,
arguments, and actions to be effective, efficient, and
safe.
Human Compassion 
Human choice is driven by more than consciousness. 
Human compassion, often inarticulable or unconscious, also 
drives human choice. Human compassion goes beyond animal 
altruism, which is limited to relatives or tribes, to a 
more universal compassion (Hume 1978, 487; A. Smith 1969, 
1976, 47-48). Annette Baier (1991), for example, 
interprets David Hume to say that our nature is "to be 
social and passionate, before it is cognitive" (28-29).
She points out that "our cognitive capacities, both in the 
species and in each human infant, develop along with our
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social and emotional capacities." Human compassion is not
without limits in time, space, and relationship, however.
Nicholas Capaldi (1989) notes that Hume distinguishes
between "weak sympathy" and "strong sympathy":
Weak sympathy is limited to the present moment. Strong 
sympathy gives us a broader perspective, "a lively 
notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether 
past, present, or future; possible, probable or 
certain." (183)
Among the foremost proponents of an ethic of 
compassion or caring are feminist philosophers, such as 
Carol Gilligan, Annette Baier, Claudia Card, Nel Noddings, 
and Rita Manning. Manning (1992), for example, has 
observed that an ethic of caring requires both a 
disposition to care and an obligation to care for (61-62). 
She concludes, however, that:
Finally, one need not respond to every need. In 
choosing how and when to respond, one should consider 
the seriousness of the need, the benefit to the one 
needing care of filling this particular need, one's own 
capacity to fill the need, and the competing needs of 
others, including oneself, that will be affected by 
filling this particular need. (64)
Procedural Values Behind the Values
Following Csikszentmihalyi (1993), this thesis
considers the various ethical'and policy systems,
principles, and models that have been espoused over human
recorded history to have been well-intentioned, but driven,
in either concept or application, by:
genetic instructions, which were once necessary to our 
survival, but are often in conflict with present
reality; the distortions of the culture in which we 
were born[;] and [the distortions] that result from the 
emergence of the self as a separate entity making its 
own claims on the mind. (xvii)
This results in attention, awareness, memories, patterns of
thought, and hierarchies of goals in consciousness that
result in different visions, values, and notions of
excellence driving our choices. It also results in
differing notions of who (or what) should be the objects of
our compassion— and what should be done to deal with them—
within those visions and reflecting those values and
notions of excellence.
Having assumed these ethical and policy systems, 
principles, and models to be well-intentioned, the question 
remains, how do we develop, maintain, and employ our 
fundamental human attributes in a world of disparate 
systems, principles, and models? The underlying premise of 
this thesis is that human beings are characterized by 
choice, consciousness, and compassion, which are 
implemented through thinking, planning and human action. 
This having been said, however, the essential human 
attributes are not capacities subject to nurturance and 
development such that they might be said to be "essentially 
human." For example, if one is to expand, raise, or 
enlarge one’s consciousness; make better choices; or deal 
more appropriately with the objects of one's compassion, 
there are more basic human capacities that must be well- 
developed, maintained, and employed for one to do so.
10
Certain human capacities allow us to further 
develop and employ consciousness, choice and compassion. I
assume these to be critical and creative thinking; 
communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in 
inquiry and action. Together, these capacities give us the 
unique capability to appreciate the nature of the world and 
our relationships to it. These three capacities, then, may 
be said to be the "Essential Human Capacities" in that they 
are of the essence and essential to our ability to relate 
to the world around us, to choose wisely, and to deal
appropriately with the objects of our compassion: in short,
our abilities to think, to choose, to plan, to act, and to 
reflect and learn successfully in a changing, often 
challenging, environment.
In the history of philosophy, the problem of the 
relationship between existence and essence has been one of 
the most difficult (New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967b, 552). 
From the ideals of Plato before the Christian Era to the 
medieval thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, much of philosophy 
had sought an abstract, universal frame of reference that 
might define existence. Hence, the Thomistic notion of 
"essence" as signifying "a mode or manner according to 
which reality might be fashioned" (1967a, 547; 1967b, 550). 
As rationalism came to dominate the philosophical scene, 
essence and existence came to be replaced by the Hegelian 
notion of idealism: "Existential reality is there but a 
backdrop or, even less, a kind of concept that combines
11
with concepts of essence to weave the abstract texture of 
the real" (1967b, 552). The 'existentialists' reacted 
insisting in various ways that the fundamental question 
was, how does one exist as a true human being?" (1967d, 
731). In this view, "the concern of the existentialist is 
not with the general and the universal but with the 
singular and the individual" (ibid.).
Having said this, and having used the term 
"essential" throughout this thesis, it is not my purpose to 
join that battle. Richard Shusterman (1992) points to the 
paradox involved in claiming that one is not an 
essentialist— it may "turn into an inverted essentialism of 
anti-essentialism which asserts 'the universality and 
necessity of the individual and contingent'" (Shusterman 
1992, 83, quoting, in part, Rorty 1989, 26). My 
perspective, as set forth in more detail in the next 
Chapter, is existentialist, implying a focus on the 
concrete and the individual as opposed to the abstract and 
the universal (New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967c, 724-25).
To avoid the Shusterman Paradox, I use the terms 
"essential" and "of the essence" in the common, descriptive 
dictionary sense of something necessary and fundamental or 
basic to human action or argument.
Toward An Essentially Human Judgment Process
This approach concentrates on the human capacities 
that human beings employ to expand consciousness, to make
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intelligent choices, and to deal properly with the objects 
of our compassion so that they may argue and act well. It 
makes a case for the development, maintenance, and 
employment of the Essential Human Capacities, which have 
evolved to exercise those attributes— critical and creative 
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and 
cooperating in inquiry and action— as integral to our 
perception, participation, processes, and policies in an 
increasingly challenging world.
In broad terms, one might say that there are two 
alternative consensual ethical systems: (1) an autonomous, 
rational set of ethical principles employed to pursue the 
individual, concerted, and mutual ends of all affected by a 
decision, which ends are sought of their own accord, or (2) 
a heteronomous, faithful set of ethical principles 
requiring adherence to the authority of another to pursue 
individual, collective, or universal ends urged by the 
other (Mises 1966, 147-48; see also Rothbard 1982, 17; 
Neuhaus 1992; Novak 1993).2 The essential difference 
between the two is that in the first instance acceptance of 
the principles follows understanding and in the second 
acceptance follows deference.
Neither is inherently right. At any particular 
point in time, the situation, as then understood, may be 
such that it would be appropriate for an individual— given 
his or her limited capacity for understanding, lack of 
time, or dearth of information available to make a
13
judgment— to defer to another's judgment as to what
constitutes an appropriate set of principles. It is just
such a division of labor in policy matters that St. Thomas
Aquinas urges in "On Kingship or The Governance of Rulers":
it is not possible for one man to arrive at the 
knowledge of all [things that are necessary for human 
life] through the use of his reason. Thus it is 
necessary for him to live in society so that one person 
can help another and different men can employ their 
reason in different ways. . . . (quoted in Sigmund 
1988, 14-17; see also Niebuhr 1932, 21)
Such deference is indeed the lot for most of us, 
most of the time. As Ludwig von Mises (1966) observed:
Common man does not speculate about the great 
problems. With regard to them he relies upon other
people's authority, he behaves as "every decent fellow
must behave," he is like a sheep in the herd. It is 
precisely this intellectual inertia that characterizes 
a man as a common man. Yet the common man does choose. 
He chooses to adopt traditional patterns or patterns 
adopted by other people because he is convinced that 
this procedure is best fitted to achieve his own 
welfare. And he is ready to change his ideology and 
consequently his mode of action whenever he becomes 
convinced that this would better serve his own 
interests. (46)
In any event, it is often the case that the ends 
sought by both approaches appear to be roughly the same. 
Whether the individual or community actively identifies and 
develops its principles, or whether she or they defer to 
the authority of another, seems to depend upon the
situation and state of development of the Essential Human
Capacities.
For example, following Aldo Leopold in A Sand 
County Almanac (1949), in part, I consider an "ethic" to be
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a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle to exist 
(202, 203), but, going beyond Leopold, I would add
. . t o  have energy, and to evolve."
Neither the world nor human beings have merely 
existed over time. Our power to choose, based upon our
consciousness and compassion, have evolved and are a part
of the world. Thus, I look at ethics, first and foremost, 
as a component of a vision of that life that is deemed to 
be good, together with the role that truth and beauty play 
in that vision, and what it means to be a human being 
within such a vision. If, as will be demonstrated later, 
that which any individual values at any given point in time 
is subjective, in the sense of being the result of 
individual intellect and moral agency, then no person or 
body of persons could have the knowledge required to make 
intelligent decisions for the entire community. It 
follows, therefore, that an ethical system ought to include 
an autonomous, rational set of ethical principles employed 
to pursue the individual, concerted, and mutual ends of all 
affected by a decision, which ends are sought of their own 
accord.
This approach is intended to provide a meta-ethical 
framework toward developing them. If the goal for an 
ethics and policy decision-making process is to reach a 
judgment that allows each and every individual to create 
and live the life he or she deems worth living, then an 
"essentially human" decision-making process seems to be of
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the essence and essential. The underlying theme of this 
thesis, therefore, is an ethics and policy framework based 
upon the development, maintenance, and employment of the 
Essential Human Capacities as components, which could be 
widely held to serve as the procedural values underlying 
the substantial values. This framework will be called an 
"Essentially Human Judgment Process."
As founded, this meta-ethical and policy system 
itself may be said to be humanistic, atheistic or agnostic, 
but it is designed rather to be "entirely neutral with 
regard to religious beliefs which do not pretend to 
interfere with the conduct of social, political, and 
economic affairs" (Mises 1966, 155). The values contained 
in religious beliefs are accounted for in the frames of 
reference of those arguing and acting, but are not included 
as a component of the framework itself. Its ultimate 
objective is aid decision-makers to arrive at good 
arguments and action-guiding principles leading to ethical 
and policy judgments that will avoid the violent conflicts 
that must disintegrate the social cooperation of acting 
individuals.
This Essentially Human Judgment Process operates 
within a broader framework of human decision-making and 
action within society, which I style the "Essential 
Interdependence Paradigm," and develop in Part II, Chapter
4. The notion of "Essential Interdependence" is used to 
emphasize the role of the Essential Human Capacities in
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social functioning and to distinguish it from a deceptively 
similar "model" developed by Emile Durkheim, which stresses 
"organic solidarity" and "functional interdependence" 
(Giddens 1971, 76-79). Of course, neither his paradigm nor 
the Essential Interdependence Paradigm developed in this 
thesis rises to being a model in the sense of being a frame 
of reference.
Conclusion and Preview
Having assumed that these Essential Human 
Capacities are critical and creative thinking,3 
communicating in symbols and concepts, and cooperating in 
inquiry and action (cf., Watson 1990, 459) and having 
identified them for inclusion into an "Essentially Human 
Judgment Process, the next task is to develop a framework 
for reaching ethical and policy judgments that (1) employs 
these Essential Human Capacities where appropriate, (2) 
evaluates the input from participants in terms of its own 
criteria for good judgment, and (3) takes into account the 
impact of the judgment upon the Essential Human Capacities 
of all those affected by it. Only through such a process 
might we approximate, what might be styled, "Essential 
Human Truth," that is, an approximation of reality as a 
means toward creating the lives we truly desire to live: an 
approximation as accurate as the employment of the well- 
developed Essential Human Capacities of those involved and 
affected will permit.
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The thesis is developed in three multi-Chapter 
Parts. In the balance of Part I, I will argue against two 
faulty assumptions underlying most modern ethical and 
policy theory and develop a number of philosophical and 
psychological concepts, which lend both credit and detail 
to elements of the proposed framework. With this 
background in mind, Part II will develop a meta- 
ethical/political framework for an essentially human ethics 
and policy judgment process based upon the human capacities 
for critical and creative thinking; communicating in 
symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and 
action. It will place special emphasis upon the impact of 
various aspects of time on human judgment.
The core theme of Part II is that these capacities 
must be well-developed and employed, or facilitated, for 
ethical and policy judgments of all sorts to be effective, 
efficient, and safe. Moreover, to the extent those 
involved or affected do not fully employ these capacities, 
that should be accounted for expressly in evaluating the 
input to our judgments. Finally, the purpose of any 
resulting ethical or policy judgment ought to be expressed 
in terms of its impact, as made and implemented, upon the 
Essential Human Capacities.
Part III applies the framework deriving a number of 
policy implications and describing developing some 
methodological guidelines, which can be used to estimate 
the degree to which a community, its judgment processes,
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and its policies approach the ideal of being essentially 
human. Though the framework has general applicability to 
all ethical and policy analysis, evaluation, making and 
implementation— including, but not limited to 
environmental, foreign, social, and economic policy— the 
guidelines will be used in this thesis to consider a single 
policy issue of great import on the current scene: single­
parent welfare policy.
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Chapter Notes/I
1-The sense in which "essence" and "essential" are 
used in this thesis is developed later in this chapter.
^The political scientist Charles Lindblom would 
suggest a third consensual system, persuasion, • in the form 
of education, advertising, and propaganda (see deHaven- 
Smith 1988, 52).
3I could follow here the reasoning of Michael Scriven 
that critical thinking necessarily includes creative 
thinking, but I am persuaded by the rationale of Matthew 
Lipman that distinguishes, and integrates them, as higher- 
order thinking. I reject, for the purposes of this thesis, 
the notion that truly comprehensive thinking requires 
"systems thinking," but would allude to that requirement by 
calling the capacity "comprehensive thinking" (compare 
Scriven 1976, 35-36 with Wilber 1995, 19-24; Lipman 1991, 
19-25; Senge 1990).
CHAPTER 2
FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING ETHICAL 
AND POLICY DECISION-MAKING
Two Faulty Assumptions
The nature of the assumptions underlying ethical 
and policy decision making are not idle matters; they are 
fundamental to the manner in which we see the world, we 
relate to it, and we act in it. As Amitai Etzioni (1988) 
has declared in another context:
At issue is the paradigm we use in trying to make 
sense out of the social world that surrounds us, and of 
which we are an integral part; the paradigm we apply in 
the quest to understand and improve ourselves, those 
dear to us, and those not so dear. (ix)
Before proceeding further, it is important to address two
common assumptions regarding human nature that underlie the
ethical and policy decision-making processes that this
thesis is designed to replace or supplement.
The first assumption is that human behavior can be 
analyzed and understood, to the relevant degree, in terms 
of general ideas considered as though they have an 
existence independent of the accumulated experiences in 
which they originated. The second assumption is that human 
behavior can be analyzed and understood, to the relevant
20
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degree, in terms of formal and impersonal relationships.
Since World War II, Anglophone writing on ethical 
and policy systems, principles, and models— both private 
and public— tends, for the most part, to be based upon 
these two faulty assumptions. Social policies based upon 
theories founded on these two assumptions frequently 
(often, necessarily) exclude the agency of the individuals 
affected, directly or indirectly, including their 
characters and subjective ends.* They are, unwittingly, a 
return to the abstract and universal of the essentialists 
and the idealists, even to the extent they are felt to be 
derived from experience.
David Hume (1977) described well the difficulty in
applying general rules derived from experience:
The forming of general maxims from particular 
observation is a very nice operation; and nothing is 
more usual, from haste or narrowness of mind, which 
sees not all sides, than to commit mistakes in this 
particular. (71 n. 36, emphasis added)
He concludes noting that: "It would be easy to discover
many other circumstances that make a difference in the
understanding of men" (ibid.).
Indeed, the issue is deeper than merely the 
potential for error due to haste or narrowness of mind. 
Claudia Card (1990), for example, summarizing and extending 
feminist ethical theory, argues in an essay entitled 
"Gender and Moral Luck," that, to the extent that ethical 
and policy decision-making are based upon the assumptions
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described above, they fail to consider relationships, 
characters, and experiences that have an experiential, 
historical richness that purely formal theory cannot reach 
and cannot capture.2 she attempts to go beyond the 
abstract notions, or values (see Lipman 1993), of justice 
and caring, in isolation, to explore the relation between 
formal and impersonal relationships with their emphasis on 
justice (to the exclusion of caring) and informal and 
personal relationships with their emphasis on caring (to 
the exclusion of fairness)(200-21).
Card follows Carol Gilligan in arguing that a 
helpful ethical perspective is relationship, both 
separation (essentially masculine) and connection 
(essentially feminine). Ultimately, she contrasts rights- 
based theory with a responsiveness-based theory, i.e., "the 
idea of taking responsibility for someone or something" 
(209). Observing that modern ethical theory, with the 
exception of David Hume, has been "preoccupied with power 
and control— its uses, its distribution, its forms" (208), 
she concludes that ethical theory lacks an ethic of 
attachment, independent of "the issues of control that have 
preoccupied contractualist and utilitarian theorists"
(214). But, in her view, an ethic of attachment is not 
necessarily an ethic of care. Accordingly, an ethic of 
relationships, attachment, and responsiveness should 
operate as the starting point for ethical inquiry in her 
view.
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There is an old saying that, "To one whose only 
tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." The 
same idea may be true in ethics and policy studies. By 
analogy, "Where one pursues understanding preoccupied with 
power and control, all basic social institutions will come 
to be seen in formal and impersonal terms." As a result, 
for epistemological reasons (especially the unavailability 
of sufficient knowledge in a timely fashion) formal and 
impersonal social institutions must necessarily ignore 
informal and personal relationships. Especially where 
distribution and control are confirmed through the coercive 
power of the state, abstract issues of justice must prevail 
over the myriad relationships that characterize a society.
Moreover, concentration upon general ideas in the 
form of prescriptions and proscriptions— and formal and 
impersonal relationships— is based upon, or at least 
supports, the notion that society may be organized as one 
pleases (Mises 1966, 2). Ultimately, failure to consider 
the characters and relationships of the individuals 
affected may result in ethical and policy decisions that 
negatively affect, or even destroy, the agency of the very 
individuals intended to be benefited.
Attacks on Reason and Expertise
A related development has been a reaction to the 
preoccupation with power and control described above, which 
has led to attacks against reason itself, especially to the
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extent that its exercise has been preempted by experts. 
Robert Formaini (1990), for example, has observed that:
Public policy in the United state is debated, analyzed, 
and implemented within a framework characterized by the 
acceptance, explicitly or implicitly, of certain 
assumptions. One of the main assumptions is the 
objective nature of the reality which surrounds us, 
along with a subsidiary assumption concerning the 
ability of our techniques to explore and to control 
that reality. (1)
In the selection of the ends or goals of policy—  
either public or private— the most common framework for 
choosing among competing goals is "some version of policy 
analysis, including cost-benefit, cost-effective, and risk- 
benefit" or a social welfare model based upon Pareto 
Optimization (Gutmann and Thompson 1990). As Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson observe:
All of these approaches rest on the moral 
foundation of utilitarianism (insofar as they have any 
moral foundation at all). They assume (1) that the 
ends or values of policies can be compared by a common 
measure of expected utility (also called happiness, 
satisfaction, or welfare) and (2) that the best policy 
or set of policies is that which maximizes the total 
expected utility.
Though the appeal of this approach is that it appears to
resolve conflicts among competing ends in a neutral way,
Gutmann and Thompson outline a number of attacks against
the basic assumptions underlying these various frameworks,
e.g., problems of aggregation and distribution (139).3
More fundamentally, Bryan D. Jones suggests that 
there are major limitations to social science theories. 
First, they are partial, incomplete, and "[suffer] in the
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extreme from problems in linking theory to data." (Jones
1988, 164-65) Second, "they fail to specify the linkages
between observable human actions and characteristics of
complex social systems." As a result, Jones argues:
Quantitative empirical studies have tended to test, 
more and more rigorously, uninteresting and 
atheoretical but statistically precise hypotheses. 
Theoreticians are only vaguely aware of rigorous 
statistical methods, and tend to be contemptuous of 
them. Because theory and data are so weakly linked, 
and because various theories are not integrated, both 
empirical studies and theoretical studies have been 
driven as much by fad and fashion as by scientific 
design. (175)
Jones urges that these circumstances "ought to make social 
scientists humble in their theoretical pretensions, meticu­
lous in their empirical analysis, and cautious in their 
policy advice."
By way of contrast, Douglas Muzzio and Gerald De 
Maio (1988, 129) view the same circumstances and observe 
that "most policy studies are empirical, providing only a 
summary of statistical associations, unable to explain the 
observed relationships." They urge, however, that formal 
theory based upon a deductive approach "can be integrated 
with policy analysis" and that, in any event, "formal 
theory is the sum of the science" (128). Thus, they cite 
Ernest Nagel, who "notes that since Aristotle it has been 
held that scientific explanations must always be rendered 
in the form of logical deduction, that the most 
comprehensive and impressive systems of explanation are of 
that form" (128 n. 3). From this they argue that:
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formal theory can be and has been relevant to major 
policy issues, [and] provides a useful way of thinking 
about problems and suggests predictive hypotheses.
[I ]t permits rigorous thinking about values and goals 
and alternative mechanisms of achieving them. (128)
The latter insight has been explored by Eugene J. 
Meehan (1990), who reported that following testing of 
federal policy making with a theoretical apparatus he 
developed for policy analysis;
first, the knowledge required for directing actions on 
defensible grounds was not usually available; second, 
where such knowledge was available, it was usually 
ignored by those responsible for making policy. Both 
those who directed the rule-making apparatus and those 
who criticized the performance depended heavily on 
procedural rather than substantive issues; there were 
few signs of significant learning and fewer still of 
the use of such learning to improve pe r f o r m a n c e .4 (18)
At bottom, the difficulty may be what Friedrich A. 
Hayek, a Nobel Prize laureate in Economics, and a dean of 
the "Austrian" school of economics, described as the 
"scientistic" approach, that is, the "propensity to imitate 
as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly 
successful physical sciences— an attempt which in our field 
[economics] may lead to outright error" (23).
These assumptions are not, however, the core of 
Formaini's (1989) objections to policy debate as currently 
experienced. Rather, the vehemence of his objections to 
the current policy debate centers rather on the role of 
experts;
Yet it may be that our confidence is not a function of 
the objective reality vie seek to model, but is rather 
the result of our having accepted the pronouncements of
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philosophers, scientists, consultants, policy analysts, 
and others who have succeeded in convincing most people 
of the efficacy of their methods of analysis. (1; see
also Saul 1992; McCollough 1991, 3, 5, 61, and 82-84)
He declares that for purposes of policy formation,
implementation, and assessment, we are "a nation addicted
to inductive advocacy." Hence, in a society dominated by
battles between experts, Formaini (1990) observes:
Quite simply, all this expertise has succeeded in
accomplishing nothing so much as it has made it
virtually impossible to tell the serious, knowledgeable 
individual from the army of bogus, politically 
motivated hucksters that dominate our modern system of 
information dissemination. (3)
Rejecting both risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis as
decisive means of policy implementation and assessment,
Formaini concludes that, since ultimately the populace's
beliefs about policies must be dealt with in any event,
current attitudes of policy elites are:
examples of the very unscientific mindset that experts 
so often deplore in other people, for they explicitly 
ignore reality by positing a world where perfectly- 
informed elites enact correct policies for the good of 
all, whether or not such policies are publicly 
supported. (98)
In the same vein, John Ralston Saul, in his book 
Voltaire's Bastards (1992), purports to condemn the impact 
of reason on public policy, when what he actually supports 
is a condemnation of the elitism of experts, who tend to 
compartmentalize knowledge. So, for Saul, "The essence of 
rational leadership is control justified by expertise" (10- 
11; see also 476-77). He makes this point saying:
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The possession and control of knowledge have become 
their central theme— the theme song of their expertise. 
However, their power depends not on the effect with 
which they use that knowledge but on the effectiveness 
with which they control its use. Thus, among the 
illusions which have invested our civilization is an 
absolute belief that the solution to our problems must 
be a more determined application of rationally 
organized expertise. The reality is that the division 
of knowledge into feudal fiefdoms of expertise has made 
general understanding and coordinated action not simply 
impossible but despised and distrusted. (8)
Daniel Yankelovich, for example, makes the same 
point in Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work 
in a Complex World (1991). Yankelovich demonstrates that 
on the issue of American competitiveness on a global scale, 
four obstacles to public understanding arise from the 
"expert perspective." First, the issue is "owned" by the 
experts as the issue is defined in technical terms staking 
an "intellectual and a turf-related claim. " Second, the 
experts hold different values from the public. Third, the 
experts in various fields transmit "confusing and 
contradictory messages to the public." Finally, the 
experts and public proceed from different frameworks and 
points of departure (105-06).
Friedrich von Hayek (1989) suggests that it is 
precisely because of an inappropriate faith in human-kind's 
ability to use reason to "construct" the world we want that 
we have many of the problems we now have. In The Fatal 
Conceit, his last book, Hayek describes "the revolt of 
instinct and reason" and cites literary figures (H.G.
Wells, George Orwell); scientists (Jacques Monod, Joseph
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Needham, Albert Einstein); and economists (John Stuart 
Mill, John Maynard Keynes) for the following four 
presuppositions regarding what constitutes actionable 
knowledge:
(1) The idea that it is unreasonable to follow what one 
cannot justify scientifically or prove 
observationally (Monod, Born);
(2) The idea that it is unreasonable to follow what one 
does not understand (Popper);
(3) The related idea that it is unreasonable to follow 
a particular course unless its purpose is fully 
specified in advance (Einstein, Russell, Keynes);
(4) The idea, also closely related, that it is 
unreasonable to do anything unless its effects are 
not only fully known in advance but also fully 
observable and seen to be beneficial (the 
utilitarians). (61-62)
Hayek notes that, applying these four presuppositions:
most tenets, institutions, and practices of traditional 
morality and of capitalism do not meet the requirements 
or criteria stated and are— from the perspective of 
this theory of reason and science— "unreasonable" and 
"unscientific". (66)
Conclusion and Preview
It appears that our ethics and policy decision­
making models are too narrowly focused, hence not 
interdisciplinary or systemic or integrative or holistic 
enough, to serve the individual and society well. It also 
appears that the philosophical search for concepts 
supporting the development of the autonomous individual as 
opposed to the heteronomous society has not provided the 
conceptual foundation adequate for an ethics and policy
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decision-making model of use to the autonomous individual
trying to understand and choose within an increasingly
complex social universe.5
This tension is demonstrated, for example, in
Matthew Lipman's (1993) approach to education.
Acknowledging that the model of education he espouses (a
reflective model described in more detail in Chapter 5 of
this thesis) has an objective of "the autonomy of the
learner," he notes that "unfortunately, autonomy has been
associated with a kind of rugged individualism: the
independent thinker as a self-sufficient cognitive macho
type, protected by an umbrella of invincibly powerful
arguments" (Lipman 1993, 19). He concludes that his model
is actually:
thoroughly social and communal. Its aim is to 
articulate the friction-causing differences in the 
community, develop arguments in support of competing 
claims, and then, through deliberation, achieve an 
understanding of the larger picture that will permit a 
more objective judgment. (ibid.)
In conclusion, then, one can predict that where
ethical and policy judgments are made on a model of general
prescriptions and proscriptions reflecting formal and
impersonal relationships, they are destined to fail to the
degree that they ignore informal, often personal,
relationships and the "different ethical preoccupations,
methods, priorities, even concepts" that surround them and
the experiences that spring from them. Following Claudia
Card, one would expect that to the extent that ethical and
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policy theory takes "only formal and impersonal rela­
tionships as paradigms of obligation and responsibility 
[they will have] produced arbitrarily biased and probably 
superficial theory" (Card 1990, 201; see also Baier 1986: 
231-260; Flanagan and Jackson 1987: 622-37; Solomon 1992, 
114). Moreover, to the extent that the models are purely 
rational, that is, models that ignore that which is felt, 
but not thought; that which is known, but not articulable; 
and that which is embedded in practices, institutions, 
customs, and traditions, but not directly observable, they 
fail to consider relationships, characters, histories, and 
experiences that have an inductive richness, which purely 
formal theory and formal theories of judgment cannot reach 
and cannot capture.
This is not to suggest that problems may be solved 
by disregarding the general principles derived from the 
accumulated experience of the human race or by arriving at 
a better understanding of informal and personal 
relationships alone. It does suggest, however, that 
effective, efficient, and safe ethical and policy decision­
making require a framework that goes beyond inductive 
advocacy or ideology dictating what we should choose and 
how we should act. Such a framework, which could be said 
to be essentially, uniquely or characteristically human, 
should employ and take into account the human capacities 
underlying consciousness, choice and compassion in general, 
and thinking, communicating, and cooperating in particular.
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It also suggests that a framework that considers the 
variety of formal and informal relationships, as well as 
the "different ethical preoccupations, methods, priorities, 
even concepts" applied in them, will include a human 
process in which each individual affected— directly or 
indirectly— participates actively, or at least has his or 
her interests well-considered by those who do participate.
These two chapters have raised the challenge and 
problem of ethics and policy decision-making by giving some 
attention to two faulty assumptions underlying ethical and 
policy theory. They have suggested that the problem with 
existing methods is fundamentally two-fold. First, these 
methods are based upon the belief that human behavior can 
be analyzed and understood in terms of general ideas 
considered as though they have an existence independent of 
the accumulated experiences in which they originated. 
Second, they are based on the belief that they need not be 
firmly rooted in an understanding that different 
relationships suggest different approaches to 
understanding. These chapters have further suggested that 
an approach rooted in that which is "essentially human" may 
meet their challenges.
The remainder of Part I treats a number of 
fundamental philosophical and psychological issues, lending 
credit and detail to the elements of the framework to be 
developed.
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Chapter Notes/2
1-See e.g., the modified central thesis of John Rawls' 
Theory of Justice as interpreted by Roberto Alejandro 
(1993: 75-100).
^Card (1990) asserts that:
Different kinds of relationships have been differently 
distributed among men and women in patriarchal society: 
a larger share of the responsibilities of certain 
personal and informal relationships to women, a larger 
share of the responsibilities of formal and impersonal 
relationships defined by institutions to men. It is 
plausible that a result has been the creation of a 
significant difference in ethical orientation. (200)
Mother commentators have raised others (see, e.g., 
Tong 1986, 12-38; see also Clark 1991).
^Following a study of federal public housing policy, 
Meehan equated twentieth century public policy makers with 
eighteenth century doctors and hospitals.
^Mises (1966) notes that it is the rational 
appreciation of the division of labor, especially as 
elaborated by British political economy, that: "substituted 
an autonomous rational morality for the heteronomous and 
intuitionist ethics of older days" (147).
CHAPTER 3
PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before turning to elaborate on the framework 
itself, there are a number of basic philosophical and 
psychological concepts to develop. For many, each is a 
controversial issue perhaps worthy of a thesis in and of 
itself.
Essential Human Capacities
The primary assumption of this thesis is that the 
essential human attributes of choice, consciousness, and 
compassion are exercised through the essentially human 
capacities of thinking, communicating, and cooperating in 
inquiry and action. Thus, an "essentially human" process 
would consider cognition, including reason, intuition, and 
imagination, in the form of critical and creative thinking; 
communicating in symbols and concepts; and social 
cooperation in inquiry and action as capacities "essential" 
to individuals acting within a society. Moreover, the 
process would be seen to be "not essentially human" to the 
extent that the Essential Human Capacities of any of those 
involved or affected by a judgment are not employed. As
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the purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework based 
upon what an "Essentially Human Judgment Process" might 
look like, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an 
argument for, or defend, these three capacities as being 
"of the essence" of humanity, but it is appropriate to 
indicate the philosophical and psychological support from 
which the framework proceeds.
The basic grounding for the Essential Human 
Capacities can be found in the works of Aristotle, 
especially the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. Though 
Aristotle based his ethical and political writings on the 
ergon or function of the human being and concluded that 
"what is peculiar to" human beings is logos or rational 
principle (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a7-18), he also noted 
two other essentially human abilities, speech (Politics 
1253a9-16), and social cooperation in perceiving and doing 
the good, the right and the other moral qualities (Politics 
1253al7-19; 1253a25-29). Thus, taking Aristotle's basic 
approach, i.e., that the end of human life is for the 
individual to live an active life of arete (human 
excellence, or virtue), ethical and policy decision-making 
intended to contribute to the human good should employ 
these Essential Human Capacities and consider the impact of 
a judgment upon them.
The role of rationality in social living is a 
fascinating issue, worthy of more attention than this 
thesis is able to grant it, but a few observations are
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appropriate, by way of extension and limitation. Robert
Nozick (1993), for example, suggests that rationality
itself may have a social component:
If rationality evolved alongside the concurrent 
rationality of others, then each person's rationality 
may have a character that fits it to work in tandem 
with that similar rationality of others. (178)
Indeed, as Ludwig von Mises (1966) has observed, our
working assumption throughout our lives is that other
people's thought processes are essentially the same as our
own though what they are conscious of and value may differ
dramatically (25, 32-36).
The psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has 
qualified the rational Aristotelian approach insofar as he 
has pointed to other mental activities in which human 
beings must become proficient if we are to create the lives 
we truly desire to live. Csikszentmihalyi (1993) 
acknowledges that ”[m]uch of what we call civilization 
consists of attempts at rationalizing life, so that action 
can be predictable and reasonable" (41). This takes the 
form of "rational, logical structures by which to order 
thoughts and actions." Nonetheless, he asserts:
The future . . .  is not constrained by rules and 
predictable outcomes. We need to cultivate more than 
logic if we want to thrive in it. We must foster 
intuition to anticipate changes before they occur; 
empathy to understand that which cannot be clearly 
expressed; wisdom to see the connection between 
apparently unrelated events; and creativity to discover 
new ways of defining problems, new rules that will make 
it possible to adapt to the unexpected. (42)
Reading Aristotle, Nozick, and Csikszentmihalyi
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together, then, these abilities may be seen to encourage, 
permit and even compel rationally the individual to employ 
these capacities in functioning within a society of other 
human beings. For purposes of this thesis, then, there are 
three essentially human capacities that must be developed 
and that are amenable to good or bad nurturance. The first 
such capacity is our capacity for thought: not just our 
rationality (see, e.g., Nagel 1990, 7-14), but our 
intuition and imagination as well.* The second is our 
capacity to communicate in symbols and concepts, our 
ability to speak of more than pain and pleasure. The third 
is our social nature, which requires life with "parents, 
children, (spouse], and generally friends and fellow 
citizens" (Kullman 1991, 99).
From this, I take it as given that such an 
individual is partly a product of the society in which he
or she is born and grows and has the rational capacity and
knowledge to understand the benefits of the division of 
effort and recombination of effort, in the form of 
cooperative inquiry and action, to attain individual ends 
within society (Mises 1966, 157-65).
In this thesis, the three essential capacities are 
defined as follows:
Critical and creative thinking is that purposeful, 
intuitive, imaginative and self-regulatory process that
results in interpretative, analytical, evaluative,
inventive and constructive judgments, together with a 
sound explanation of the evidential, conceptual, 
understanding, systemic or methodological
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considerations upon which they are based.
Communicating in symbols and concepts is that mutually 
purposeful, reflectively open process that results in 
understanding, consensus, appreciation, illumination, 
resolution, and elevation.
Cooperating in inquiry and action is concerted critical 
and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and 
concepts; and action aiming at the attainment of common 
ends, together with an understanding of how to 
complement one another's efforts, including, but not 
limited to, cooperative action aiming at the free and 
creative exploration of complex and subtle issues.
Optimal Performance and the 
Essential Human Capacities
The goal of this thesis is to develop an 
essentially human judgment process involving thinking, 
planning, and acting as part of an autonomous, rational set 
of meta-ethical principles that recognizes the value of 
multiple perspectives in developing the understanding 
necessary to achieve optimal performance (but see Lomasky 
1987, 4 2-4 5 ).2 it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
fully develop the rich notion of "optimal performance," 
which is developed and documented by Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi in Flow: The Psychology of Optimal 
Experience (1991) and The Evolving Self: A Psychology for 
the Third Millennium (1993), but it will be helpful to 
touch on the main conditions he describes and touch on its 
relationship to what Peter M. Senge (1990) describes a 
"creative tension."
In his books, Csikszentmihalyi presents what he
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describes as a "summary of the principles that make living 
worthwhile" (1993, xi). Csikszentmihalyi describes the 
rare state of consciousness in action that is both exciting 
and involving. He describes this state as "flow."
Aristotle argued that the truly virtuous would find 
pleasure in doing the right thing at the right time in the 
right way (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098al6-17; 2.6.1106b36- 
1107a2). Csikszentmihalyi (1990; 1993), acknowledges 
Aristotle (1990, 1) and suggests that if certain conditions 
are met, one will experience flow, which he describes as:
1. A sense of pleasure
2. A merging of awareness and action
3. A sense of control
4. An altered sense of time, which usually seems to 
pass faster
5. A sense of harmony and growth
6. A sense that the experience is worth doing for its 
own sake
Csikszentmihalyi lays out six conditions for flow to occur:
1. It must be a meaningful activity for the agent;
2. The agent must know what has to be done;5
3. The project must present a balance of challenges 
and skills,4 relative to that particular agent;
4. The environment must provide the opportunity for 
the agent's concentration and involvement; and
5. There must be unambiguous feedback.
6. A sense that control is possible in principle.5
According to Csikszentmihalyi (1993), meaningful activity 
includes:
1. Purpose and vision, which identify us as a part of 
the universal order and identify us with harmonious 
growth;
2. Challenges that allow us to express our potential, 
to learn about our limits, to stretch our being.
(82)
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At first glance, these conditions appear to be too 
narrowly focused, essentially unattainable, except for the 
few closely bounded and rules-based activities that he 
describes: rock climbing, chess, driving, and conversation. 
Life is too complex, fluid, even chaotic for such 
conditions to pertain. However, an approach that refers to 
a similar "feeling" derived from activity is Peter M.
Senge’s notion of "creative tension."
Temporarily abandoning my scheme of not addressing 
standards and criteria in favor of addressing capacities 
and processes, one of Senge's five disciplines of the 
"learning organization" is that of "personal mastery." It 
is "the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening 
our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of 
developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively" 
(Senge 1990, 7). It embodies four underlying movements:
1. continually clarifying what is important to us
2. continually learning how to see current reality 
more clearly^
3. continually focusing on what one truly wants, that 
is, on one's visions
4. having the character— e.g., the integrity and 
courage— to hold, and stand for, a vision outside 
of the social mainstream. (141, 149)
When the foregoing is accomplished, Senge maintains 
that there is a natural tendency to seek resolution that 
tends to result in creative tension, that is, a force to 
bring them together. An accompanying result is emotional 
tension, which is the state of anxiety that often arises 
from creative tension.7 The essence of personal mastery is
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learning how to generate and sustain creative tension in 
all aspects of our lives— and over the course of our 
lifetimes— while managing the emotional tension that 
accompanies it.8 One is committed to generating and 
sustaining creative tension. While holding this creative 
tension, one remains clear on one's vision and continues to 
inquire into current reality (211-12, 226). One feels as 
though one is a part of a larger creative process, which 
they can influence but cannot unilaterally control (142).
Reading these together with Aristotle and 
Csikszentmihalyi suggests the conditions for excellence 
that more closely approximate life as we must frequently 
live it. Thus, the restated conditions of excellence 
followed in this thesis are:
1. It must be a meaningful activity for the agent;
2. The agent must know what has to be done;
3. The project must present a balance of challenges 
and abilities, relative to that particular agent;
4. The environment must provide the opportunity for 
the agent's concentration and involvement;
5. There must be sufficient feedback to permit a clear 
vision, an accurate, insightful view of current 
reality, and reasonable expectations of the 
possibilities of future action; and
6. A sense that influencing the creative process is 
possible in principle.
This thesis, then, follows the conditions and 
definitions of Flow and Creative Tension as necessary 
components of Quality Action within the Essential 
Interdependence Paradigm, which is developed in Part II, 
Chapter 4. It concludes with Aristotle, Csikszentmihalyi 
and Senge, who wrote from different perspectives in time
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and space, that approaching life as an aesthetic 
performance is a project of creating our own lives: 
applying complex skills, leading to challenging goals; 
going beyond what one has already achieved; and mastering 
new skills, new knowledge, new understanding, new attitudes 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1993, 180; Senge 1990, passim).9 
Summarized in the Essential Interdependence Paradigm as 
"embracing change as an opportunity for learning and 
growth," happiness is equivalent to individual excellence.
Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral Decision-making
Here, we distinguish between pragmatic, ethical, 
and moral judgments, in a vein similar to that suggested by 
Jurgen Habermas (1993).1° It may be, as one of the 
dominant texts in business ethics (Singer 1993) suggests, 
that:
in everyday parlance, we interchange "ethical" and 
"moral" to describe people we consider good and actions 
we consider right. And we interchange "unethical" and 
"immoral" to describe what we consider bad people and 
wrong actions. (1)
Nonetheless, it appears to be of value to distinguish
between an ethical and a moral judgment, as set forth below
(see Williams 1985).
Though the tripartite division among judgments is 
suggested by Habermas, the interpretation of all three—  
pragmatic, ethical and moral— judgments used in this thesis 
differ greatly from those of Habermas. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to set forth in detail the reasons why
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I think Habermas' definitions are faulty— and the 
implications that flow from them, dangerous— but for the 
most part, they are based on his analysis that all ethical 
and moral judgments stem from discourse between the 
affected persons. Thus, he restricts ethical decision­
making to the individual and moral decision-making to 
judgments affecting others solely as developed through 
discourse. This thesis follows the more Aristotelian- 
Hayekian notion of ethics as being a matter of
understanding "the better view" as incorporated in custom
and tradition (the endoxa) and a more narrowly drawn notion 
of morality following Immanuel Kant as an autonomous 
rational process of determining the right thing to do among 
autonomous, rational beings, especially those involved and 
affected, as far as is reasonably possible (see also 
McCollough 1991, 9-10J.11
Pragmatic Judgments 
A pragmatic judgment involves making a rational 
choice of means in the light of:
fixed purposes or of the rational assessment of goals
in the light of existing preferences. [Here, o]ur will 
is already fixed as a matter of fact by our wishes and 
values; it is open to further determination only in 
respect of alternative possible choices of means or 
specification of e n d s . 1 ^  (Habermas 1993, 3)
A pragmatic judgment, for these purposes, is either ego- or
ethno-centric and is pursued solely from the perspective(s)
of the individual judgment maker(s).*3 The question asked
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in this context is, what must I do, in a particular 
situation, to realize certain values or goals?
Ethical Judgments
An ethical judgment involves the values themselves; 
it is a question of what is a good life for an individual 
and for a community. According to Habermas (1993):
From this point of view, other persons, other life 
histories, and structures of interests acquire 
importance only to the extent that they are 
interrelated or interwoven with my identity, my life 
history, and my interests within the framework of an 
intersubjectively shared life. My development unfolds 
against a background of traditions that I share with 
other persons; moreover my identity is shaped by 
collective identities, and my life history is embedded 
in encompassing historical forms of life. To that 
extent the life that is good for me also concerns the 
forms of life that are common to us. (6, citing Sandel 
1982; see also Hall 1987)
Unlike pragmatic judgments, ethical judgments— and, 
more broadly, policy or political judgments— are not fixed 
with regard to values and the ultimate ends sought by 
action. Ethical judgments start from one of two premises:
(1) that all members of a given organization or community 
have certain shared values and views of, "What it is that 
makes for a good life in the company of others" or (2) that 
certain individuals, or a group of individuals, have at 
least one shared end, that is, to determine what it is they 
can, and must, mutually value in order to cooperate 
successfully.
Ethical judgment, then, may be seen as the process
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of defining what a successful life is for a human being at
a particular time and place; determining ends, goals and
objectives one should strive to attain; identifying
appropriate means to reach appropriate ends; and developing
or discovering the values, principles, and tenets one
should apply in choosing among the competing means and ends
available to him or her. As Mises (1966), declared:
Ethical doctrines are intent upon establishing scales 
of value according to which man should act, but does 
not always act. They claim for themselves the vocation 
of telling right from wrong and of advising man 
concerning what he should aim at as the supreme good. 
They are normative disciplines aiming at the cognition 
of what ought to be. (95)
So, ethical judgments, driven in part by ethical 
doctrines, should be seen to operate as filters. One type 
of ethical judgment determines what ends should be pursued 
and what ends should be rejected for an individual or 
community to live a good life. Another type determines 
which means might be employed toward which ends, and which 
means should be rejected. Yet another deals with apparent 
and real conflicts in choosing between otherwise 
appropriate, but competing, ends and means. Ethical 
judgments as to ends, means, and values bring to the 
decision-making process the product of earlier reflection 
or deliberation— or the wisdom of accumulated experience, 
either personal or social— that limited the range of ends, 
means, and values deemed to be good. This reflection or 
wisdom usually involved that deemed conducive to the good
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over the long-run: making it all the more valuable (and 
hard to follow) in the short-run (see, e.g., Niebuhr 1932, 
86-87).15
If the acting individual were free of any social 
forces, we might follow Mises (1966) in declaring that:
In making his choice man chooses not only between 
various material things and means. All human values 
are offered for option. All ends and all means, both 
material and ideal issues, the sublime and the base, 
the noble and the ignoble, are ranged in a single row 
and subjected to a decision which picks one and sets 
aside another. Nothing that men aim at or want to 
avoid remains outside of this arrangement into a unique 
scale of gradation and preference. (3)
Despite having claimed that "all ends and all means, both
material and ideal issues" are "offered for option," Mises
acknowledges that:
The mores of their social environment are a power which 
people are forced to consider. Those recognizing the 
spuriousness of the generally accepted opinions and 
habits must in each instance choose between the 
advantages to be derived from resorting to a more 
efficient mode of acting and the disadvantages 
resulting from the contempt of popular prejudices, 
superstitions, and folkways. (648)
Thus, this process applies even where the judgment maker is
not convinced that the end or means or values are correct,
but rather bows to the fact that they are endorsed by
others.
Ethical judgments are highly ego-centric and ethno­
centric; they are concerned with the individual and social 
goals accepted by that individual and that community at 
that time and place. Whether the society derives from a
"community of beliefs" or is one based on cooperation, 
which has its own has its own intrinsic morality (Durkheim 
1961 quoted in Giddens 1971, 76-77; see also Rorty 1992, 
38-62), the sense of self operates to determine who one is 
and who one believes that one should be. This sense of 
self, however, is bound up in tradition, being the 
embodiment of the thoughts of others preserved through 
language (Mises 1966, 176-77). Ethical judgments, in this 
sense, involve autonomous rationality, that is, the person 
is self-legislating, but it is a subjective autonomy.
Though self-legislating and subjective, they are not 
without limits. First, the autonomous rationality of other 
individuals, in that time or place must be respected. 
Second, the actions of other acting individuals are data 
that they must take into account in their actions. Third, 
those who contend that there is a conflict between the 
autonomous purposeful actions of individuals or between the 
autonomous purposeful actions of individuals on the one 
hand and the commonweal on the other, "cannot avoid 
advocating the suppression of the individuals' right to 
choose and to act" (730).
Ethical judgments are holistic in that they situate 
a person squarely in the middle of his or her environment 
and consider the "goodness" of the individual (or group) at 
that time and that place (see, e.g., Nozick 70-71, 208 n. 
11). Further, this holism considers it to be "of the 
essence" that a person doing the right thing does it
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habitually and cheerfully.1® So, emotions and rationality 
are considered relevant to an ethical judgment. The 
questions asked in this circumstance are, "Who am I [are 
we], and who would I [we] like to be?" And, "Is it 'good' 
for me [us] to act in a particular way in the long run, all 
things considered?" (Habermas 1993, 4-5; see also Solomon 
1984, 3).
Moral Judgments 
Jurgen Habermas suggests a distinction between 
pragmatic, ethical and moral judgments that has some value 
for purposes of this thesis, though I embrace the 
distinction for reasons other than those given by Habermas. 
At first, Habermas argues that a moral judgment is one that 
asks the question, "Whether I can will that a maxim should 
be followed by everyone as a general l a w . "17 Though this 
is formulated in terms of the Kantian categorical 
imperative, Habermas later argues that a moral judgment, by 
contrast, involves the examination of "our maxims as to 
their compatibility with the maxims of others."!® Here, 
Habermas cites Kant as providing that a moral judgment 
requires that "Everyone must be able to will that the 
maxims of our action should become universal law."!9 This 
thesis follows Habermas' first formulation, but assumes 
that a moral decision is one made by a rational, autonomous 
person for articulable reasons that are "universal" because 
any rational, autonomous person would have made that
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decision. The question asked is, "Whether I can will that 
a maxim should be followed by everyone as a general law" 
(see also Nozick 1993, 5).20
Moral Process for Ethical Decision-making
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop 
fully, but here we distinguish between universal laws 
(moral law) that are procedural and may never be violated, 
especially in making ethical judgments (maxims implemented 
through empathy, patience, integrity and courage in a 
particular place and time) and universal laws that are 
substantive (not lying, not killing). If we assume for the 
moment that our capacities for critical and creative 
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and 
cooperating in inquiry and action are "of the essence" of a 
human being, then we abuse the very capacities that make us 
human beings if we violate the procedural laws. For 
example, under no circumstances— if we are to act as free, 
dignified human beings— can we fail to honestly employ our 
reason in our judgment processes, relying instead solely on 
the views of others. Under no circumstances— if we are to 
act as free, dignified human beings— can we fail to afford 
the time, energy and patience necessary to strive for 
mutual understanding. Under no circumstances— if we are to 
act as free, dignified human beings— can we fail to 
cooperate with others in inquiry and action in order to 
develop a better understanding of reality and our abilities
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to create a future more in keeping with our purposes and 
visions. Even when qualified by "reasonableness ("as far 
as is reasonably possible"), these same values apply to 
determining what is reasonable under the circumstances.
In another context, Mises refers to this as the
alter ego problem. In response to the empiricists,
behaviorists and positivists, Mises argues that, though it
cannot be proven, it is a workable proposition that:
there is only one "logic" that is intelligible to the 
human mind, and that there is only one mode of action 
that is human and comprehensible to the human mind. 
(Mises 1966, 25)
So, Mises concludes that any workable world view or
ideology concerned with human action in the world as we
know it must operate under the principle that each of us
"deals with every other human being as if the other were a
thinking and acting being like himself" for the very
utilitarian reason that it works (24).
This suggests that there is a rational basis for 
certain generally accepted "universal values" deriving not 
from their beneficial consequences, but from the principle 
that every human being must deal with every other human 
being as a thinking, planning, and acting being. Universal 
values, such as honesty, promisekeeping, and civic 
responsibility, can now be seen to be derived from a purely 
rational theory of social cooperation.
These fundamental moral principles are open to 
examination by reason and to demonstration by logical
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methods. It follows from these that we must, to avoid 
contradiction, think and act as though the other human 
beings with whom we are dealing are thinking moral agents, 
just as we are, even, or especially, when they advocate 
different thoughts, feelings, and actions than would we.
If we treat other people as thinking moral agents 
and if we are going to pursue our own purposes; visions; 
and goals and objectives in the society of others, we 
cannot expect to succeed over time unless we recognize that 
they likewise have purposes; visions; and goals and 
objectives of their own worthy of respect. Moreover, even 
(or especially) we should think of people as feeling moral 
agents who must "reach out towards the discovery of the 
value of life, not through the acceptance of standards of 
good feeling, nor through the imposition of conceptions of 
goodness upon his emotional life, but through the free 
exercise of his own emotional life" (Macmurray 1962, 1992, 
38-39). It follows from this that nothing may be permitted 
to silence rational discussion and dialogue or reflection 
and inquiry, but, far to the contrary, everything must be 
attempted to promote such inquiry (see, e.g., Mill 1859, 
1956).
Ten "universal" value statements developed by the 
Josephson Institute of Ethics (1991) may be representative. 
The Institute suggests ten statements that people from all 
cultures, religions and communities would use to describe a 
"good" person:
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1. Honesty: being truthful, straightforward, 
forthright, frank, candid.
2. Integrity: being principled, courageous, 
scrupulous, honorable, upright.
3. Loyalty: being faithful and devoted, but not blind 
obedience or unquestioning acceptance of the status 
quo.
4. Accountability: accepting responsibility, leading 
by example, avoiding the appearance of impropriety.
5. Fairness: being open-minded and impartial, avoiding 
making arbitrary, capricious or biased decisions.
6. Caring for Others: being courteous, prompt, decent, 
preserving dignity and privacy of others.
7. Respect: treating people with respect and honoring 
their privacy.
8. Promise-keeping: being trustworthy, reliable, 
abiding by the spirit and letter of agreements.
9. Responsible Citizenship: law abiding, opposing 
unjust laws, exercising democratic rights.
10. Pursuit of Excellence: being committed, doing one's 
best, maintaining one's competence.21
It appears that these universal values (as defined by the
Institute) are "universal" only insofar as they are
essentially procedural rules setting norms for translating
thought into action. In other words, the "devil is in the
details" of applying these rules to situation in which one
finds oneself.
For example, there is no universal agreement on
"never lying" as Immanuel Kant suggested in his essay On
the Supposed Right to Lie Out of Love for Mankind (Jaspers
1962, 71-72). However, there could be universal agreement
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with the proposition that in determining what is reality, 
including the points of view of others, nothing is to be 
gained by being dishonest. This is so even if in following 
the process one reaches the decision to lie under the 
circumstances has concluded that the results of lying are 
less severe than the results of not lying could be (e.g., 
lying as a social grace, lying to a killer asking for the 
location of his intended victim). One must have integrity 
in pursuing the process of making a decision, though one 
may act in a manner that might seem unprincipled under 
other circumstances (e.g., paying bribes to have access to 
a country to save lives). Fidelity in the process of 
determining reality is essential, though being unfaithful 
where circumstances so dictate would reflect life in a 
world not populated solely by other rational people (e.g., 
maintaining the attorney-client privilege as to past 
crimes, but disclosing as to intended future crimes).
Though this smacks of ethical relativism, it should 
not be seen as artificial to distinguish between universal 
values in procedure and universal values in judgments. 
Conceptually, there is great value in consciously 
determining how thought would be applied in action in a 
world populated by rational beings. This describes the 
substantive maxim to be considered, as well as a world that 
fully nurtures and employs the Essential Human Capacities. 
That the substantive maxim has to be modified or even 
abandoned in the concrete world in which the individual
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thinks and acts serves to vividly reflect that ultimately 
we are responsible through our choices for who we are and 
the quality of the world around us. For this choice to be 
rational, however, the ethical judgments that modify or 
abandon the substantive moral judgments can only be arrived 
at by following the procedural universal values. The 
substantive moral judgments in turn might only be 
appropriate without modification in a wholly rational 
world, e.g., Kant's Kingdom of Ends.
From this it follows that, in all our ethical and 
policy decision-making, we should also test the pragmatic 
judgment by testing it for its "essential humanity." A 
quality judgment that involves (and considers the impact 
upon) that which is essentially human should result in 
autonomous acting human beings who learn, have a sense of 
community, and are of good character. Thus it is possible 
that a pragmatic, essentially utilitarian, judgment, may 
be unethical in the sense that it has not considered the 
Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or 
affected, i.e., it is not essentially human. Further, it 
is possible that a judgment that is ethical may be immoral 
because it is not universalizable beyond its time and place 
and the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or 
affected. Finally, it is possible that a moral judgment 
may be unethical because it does not reflect the time and 
place of the action, and the degree of Essential Human
Capacity development.22
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It is this distinction between the ethical and the 
moral that explains much of the confusion in the area of 
ethics. As there is no universally accepted definition of 
either the "ethical" or the "moral," for the purposes of 
this thesis, an ethical (including policy) judgment is one 
that clarifies individual self-understanding, individual or 
community values, or the notion of what is a good life for 
that individual or that community. Those judgments then 
become the givens that pragmatic judgments strive to 
a c c o m p l i s h . 23 Moral judgments, on the other hand, are 
those arrived at through pure reason (based upon an 
individual's own understanding of reality,) or pure faith, 
based upon authority accepted on faith, which are 
independent of his or her character and community's values, 
goals or projects. These commands are truly 
universalizable throughout the kingdom of rational ends, or 
by omnipotent and omniscient authority.
Such moral judgments may also provide procedural 
rules used to regulate the processes of arriving at 
pragmatic or ethical judgments. Honesty and integrity (in 
the sense of completeness or wholeness), for example, are 
two values without which any other judgment is necessarily 
flawed. For example, to the extent communications or 
reflection is not honest or whole, the arguments made, the 
knowledge relied upon, and the actions taken are 
potentially fraught with unnecessary risk. These judgments 
do not, however, suggest the conclusions to be reached in
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this context. They do provide the basic rational values 
that suggest how a rational society should organize various 
ends.
Human action within a society that does not see the 
value in ideal actions would be nonetheless considered 
ethical, if embraced by the community. That community 
might, from another perspective, be immoral or even 
unethical when it acts within a greater society, but its 
actions would not be considered unethical within its own 
values structure.
For example, from a purely rational point of view, 
an autonomous individual could will that all commercial 
transactions be conducted honestly without any puffing or 
bargaining, since only the real value of a good or service 
to the vendor could honestly be conveyed. This would be a 
moral command, a duty of a rational person in a community 
of rational persons. In the Middle East bazaar, however, 
bargaining is expected and, indeed, its absence would deny 
one of the joys in life. Thus, this activity would not be 
considered unethical, though in a purely rational sense, 
neither ego-centered nor ethno-centered, setting a high 
"asking price" is immoral. This may explain why it is so 
easy to agree as to the identity of "universal values," yet 
so difficult to apply them. Universal values are the way 
we ought to act if everyone acted, or could be made to act, 
that way. But, since everyone does not act in accordance 
with those values, it may be perfectly rational, at least
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from a short-term perspective, to act contrary to them. 
Thus, the principal path to developing a "good" society may 
be less in teaching universal values, than broadening 
perspective, i. e., expanding consciousness and compassion 
as means toward better choices.
Knowledge and Moral Behavior
It may be that social norms are irrational. It may 
be that over time, if everyone told the truth, even to 
killers, the world would be a better place. It may be that 
taking personal responsibility for one's place in, and 
understanding of, the world, dictates that one should 
embrace fate, amor fati,24 rather than have someone 
intervene to relieve oneself of the consequences of 
decisions made. But, there is yet another reason why that 
which is "merely ethical" might be more "right" than a 
purely moral judgment.
We, as individual human beings, create the world in 
which we live. Much that we "know" we cannot articulate, 
as much knowledge is embedded in customs, traditions, or 
practices. If, however, deeply-held understandings of the 
situation cannot be articulated, except in terms of 
traditions or customs or practices, then a moral judgment 
based upon all known communicable facts could not take into 
account all of the relevant facts. Without the knowledge 
that is embedded in traditions or customs or practices, the 
context can not be understood well enough for a rational
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decision to be made, hence intuition or imagination must 
complete the thinking process.
Moreover, to the extent that knowledge is embedded 
in traditions, customs, and practices, then an ethical 
judgment apparently contrary to a moral judgment might be 
the "right" decision under the circumstances. Thus, the 
values implicit in traditions, customs, or practices, which 
seem irrational on their face, may actually translate 
knowledge, otherwise unattainable, that make them quite 
rational (see, e.g., Mises 1981, 95-105; Gray 1984, 28, 36- 
39; Hayek 1989, 75-76).25
In the final analysis, applying a purely rational 
maxim in the real world, where much that is knowledge 
cannot be expressed or ascertained except through custom, 
tradition, etc., may not be rational. As Thomas E. 
McCollough (1991) observed:
If what we know is reduced to technological 
knowledge, it will exclude that which gives it meaning 
and value and that which would enable human beings—  
political beings— to appropriate it in humanly 
meaningful ways. . . . The more bits and pieces of 
knowledge are fitted together in social and technical 
theory, the more necessary it is to relate them to the 
intangibles, the tacit values, human qualities of 
community. (17)
McCollough quotes Michael Polanyi (1966, 61-62) saying:
traditionalism, which requires us to believe before we 
know, and in order that we may know, is based on a 
deeper insight into the nature of knowledge and of the 
communication of knowledge than is a scientific 
rationalism that would permit us to believe only 
explicit statements based on tangible data and derived 
from these by a formal inference, open to repeated
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testing. (51)
As Friedrich A. Hayek (1989) observed in discussing 
the famous John Maynard Keynes' justification for his 
economic views:
The slogan that "in the long run we are all dead" is 
also a characteristic manifestation of an unwillingness 
to recognize that morals are concerned with effects in 
the long run— effects beyond our possible perception—  
and of a tendency to spurn the learnt discipline of the 
long view. (57)
Hayek (1978) anticipated this thought in his Nobel Prize
acceptance speech declaring:
If man is not to do more harm than good in his 
efforts to improve the social order, he will have to 
learn that in this, as in all other fields where 
essential complexity of an organized kind prevails, he 
cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make 
mastery of the events possible. (23-24)
Essential Human Truth
It remains to consider what the product of an 
Essentially Human Judgment Process would be. I have 
already given it a name, Essential Human Truth; it is the 
product of human action and human argument employing the 
well developed, maintained, and employed Essential Human 
Capacities. As the product of an Essentially Human 
Judgment Process, it follows that it would involve input 
from all those involved in or affected by the judgment. We 
need now to consider what that input itself would be.
Essential Human Truth must be the product of an 
Essentially Human Judgment Process that has as its input
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the desires, beliefs, and expectations of all those 
involved or affected, which desires, beliefs, and 
expectations are themselves evaluated in terms of the 
Essentially Human Judgment Process. That is to say that 
all desires, beliefs, and expectations would not be given 
equal dignity. Desires, beliefs, and expectations would be 
rationally criticized with the Essentially Human Judgment 
Process as criterion at a minimum.
This is not to say that there is no room for
feelings, tacit knowledge, tradition or knowledge embedded
in practices in Essential Human Truth; it is only necessary
that they can be explained or put into perspective (see,
e.g., Damasio 1994, 18-20, Chap. 11; Macmurray 1962, 1992).
Further, as Thomas E. McCollough (1991) observes in another
context, imagination is a component of comprehensive
thinking in the form of "moral imagination:"
The moral imagination broadens and deepens the context 
of decision-making to include the less tangible but 
most meaningful feelings, aspirations, ideals, 
relationships. It encompasses the core values of 
personal identity, loyalties, obligations, promises, 
love, trust, and hope. Ethical judgment consists in 
making these values explicit and taking responsibility 
for judging their implications for action. (17)
So it is that, though Essential Human Truth must be the
goal of any ethical and policy process, it will never be
fully rational or communicable. It may remain buried in
feelings, language, customs, traditions, and institutions,
but it will be discoverable and explainable enough to be
put to use. For example, with the expansion of global
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trade, a plethora of books on etiquette around the globe 
has emerged for the business person. The books seldom give 
the "reasons" behind etiquette; it is enough that 
compliance with the demands of etiquette is of great 
instrumental value for successful international trade.
Through the development and use of the Essential 
Human Capacities, this Essential Human Truth may be found 
in what the accumulated and well-considered experiences of 
those involved or affected suggest might work in the 
struggle to create lives they truly desire to live. Thus, 
this approach is conservative in the sense that it honors 
the past, yet liberal in that it requires that new and 
broader perspectives be brought to bear on, "What we know
to be true."26
Bases of An "Essentially Human" Judgment Process
What is required, then, is a framework of the 
individual within society that reflects a theory of action 
and argumentation that is "essentially human" in concept, 
process, and policy. It would be a framework that fully 
employs not only reason, but all of the essentially human 
capacities employed to intuit, to dream, to make sense of 
our world, to understand one another, and to function well 
within the society of our choosing or our making. Such a 
theory of action and argumentation could be expressed in 
the form of a framework that provides a set of assumptions, 
considerations, understandings, strategies, principles, and
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practices to serve as foundations for the thinking, 
planning, and acting that permits us to engage in 
purposeful living. For purposes of this thesis, I will 
concentrate on the basic assumptions, considerations, and 
understandings that underlie the practice of making 
excellent pragmatic and ethical decisions rather than the 
specific skills, principles, algorithms, or heuristics that 
one would apply. These also should be selected as proper 
subjects of an Essentially Human Judgment Process, and are 
well developed, across the human spectrum elsewhere.
There are a number of assumptions underlying an 
essentially human judgment process. First, it seems 
appropriate that there be some process in which the 
individual human life appears as the primary unit of 
significance in arriving at quality judgments: pragmatic, 
ethical, and moral (Meehan 1990, 8). Second, because of 
the inherent subjectivity of our individual wants, desires, 
and purposeful actions, some relatively objective criteria, 
which reflect the "essence" of humanity, should be employed 
to evaluate both the process and the product of such 
judgment.27 Third, this suggests that a focus on the basic 
capacities that are essentially human, if not distinctively 
human, might bring some degree of objectivity to an 
otherwise subjective study. Fourth, since our goal is 
effective, efficient, and equitable policy— and since 
policy requires thinking, planning, and acting— we might 
limit the essences under consideration to those employed in
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those activities.
Basic Assumptions 
There are a number of fundamental assumptions that 
suggest the structure of this framework. First, if we 
value our rational nature, we are compelled to conclude 
that we are responsible beings (1) who have unique purposes 
and visions (see, e.g., Mises 1966; Meehan 1981, 5);28 (2) 
who see "reality" from unique perspectives (Damasio 1994, 
Chap. 5); (3) who make purposeful choices among 
alternatives and act (Mises 1966); and (4) whose lives are 
the consequences of those choices. Second, if we value our 
rational nature, there is no rational basis for not 
respecting other rational beings and their purposes and 
visions; their points of view; the choices they make; and 
their right to make those choices (Mises 1966, 24). Third, 
freedom to think, plan, and act— alone and in voluntary 
cooperation with others— is a necessary condition for a 
rational and purposeful being to live his or her life. 
Fourth, irrespective of human "nature" or the human 
"condition," there are certain traits, characteristics, and 
capacities that are "essentially human" that are employed 
in any judgment process and are often adversely affected by 
the implementation of a judgment made. Fifth, human beings 
who develop, maintain and employ these Essentially Human 
Capacities flourish as persons. Sixth, communities 
composed of such persons are more apt to flourish as the
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individuals within them flourish. Seventh, policies whose 
ends and means employ and nurture the Essential Human 
Capacities of all those involved or affected can be 
expected to be more successful than those that do not. 
Eighth, and more specifically, policies are more 
successful, social organizations run more effectively, 
efficiently, and equitably, and persons flourish because 
employing the Essential Human Capacities results in Quality 
Judgments (as defined herein) which tend to encourage their 
employment and nurture. Finally, if we focus on the 
Essential Human Capacities, then the judgment process we 
seek should be one that (as far as is reasonably possible):
(1) consciously employs the Essentially Human 
Capacities of all persons directly or indirectly 
affected by a human action toward finding Essential 
Human Truth;
(2) has as an ultimate goal the achievement of optimal 
experience through the development, maintenance, 
and employment of those essentially human 
capacities; and
(3) expressly accounts for the extent to which a 
judgment or action is less than essentially human 
in either its understanding, making, 
implementation, or evaluation, that is, in either 
the process or the resultant policy.
Society and the Individual 
Society— whether the family, an organization, or a 
nation— has no life independent of the people composing it. 
In this sense, society can be defined as "concerted action, 
cooperation" (Mises 1966, 144-45; see also Giddens 1971,
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76-77 and Elster 1985, 136-55). If we see the individual 
human being and collective human beings as engaged in 
purposeful actions, then there is a reciprocal relationship 
between the acts of the individual and the society as a 
whole, as the acts (over time) ultimately define both the 
individual and the society (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics; 
Habermas 1993).
Society is characterized by the rational
appreciation of the benefits of a division of human effort
and the association of human effort on the part of each
individual that enables everyone to pursue his or her
interests more effectively and efficiently in society than
in isolation (Mises 1981, 418; Mises 1966, 143-45; but see
Hayek, Forward to Mises 1981, xxiii-iv). Robert Nozick
(1993), following Friedrich A. Hayek, has observed that:
The social nature of our economic, intellectual, and 
political lives enables us to benefit from imaginations 
we do not ourselves possess— and no one can be equally 
imaginative in all areas, if only because this requires 
an alert attention we are limited in. (174)
So, there is a knowledge component to the division of
labor, in that specialization focuses attention and
unleashes imagination and creativity. In short, a
necessary consequence of a division of human effort— absent
fraud, coercion or force— is that the ends of the
individual can be best satisfied (or only satisfied)
through some degree of cooperation with those others who
supply the goods, services and relationships that meet
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those needs. From this division derives what Emile
Durkheim (1961, quoted in Giddens 1971) described as, "its
own intrinsic morality:"
we may thus say that the division of labour produces 
solidarity only if it is spontaneous. But by 
spontaneity we must understand not simply the absence 
of express and overt violence, but of anything that 
might, even indirectly, shackle the free employment of 
the social force that each person carries in himself. 
This not only supposes that individuals are not 
relegated to particular functions by force, but also 
that no sort of obstacle whatsoever prevents them from 
occupying in the social framework the position which 
accords with their capacities.29 (81)
What the Framework Should Look Like 
If the foregoing set of assumptions were true, or 
highly plausible, it would follow that a framework for an 
ethical and policy judgment process should be characterized 
by those "essentially human" aspects of the human 
individual within human society. If we divided the ethical 
ends of policy decision-making, they would relate to 
purposes, goals, and effects (see, e.g., Nagel and Mills 
1993, 37-42): the well-considered purposes of all those 
affected by the judgment; the well-considered goals implied 
by those purposes of all those affected; and the effects of 
the judgment, not only in reaching any set of goals, but 
upon the Essential Human Capacities. Failure to follow 
such a framework should suggest that either one has failed 
to employ the fullest human capacity or has ignored the 
potential impact of the judgment upon the essentially human 
traits, characteristics and abilities of the persons
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affected by the judgment. Thus, the fundamental concept is 
that, at least presumptively, an ethical and policy 
judgment process applied by humans to make decisions 
affecting other humans ought to employ the Essential Human 
Capacities and consider the impact of the judgment upon the 
Essential Human Capacities of the persons affected thereby, 
as far as is reasonably possible.
Writer's Perspective on Ethical and Policy Matters
I approach this problem as one attempting to 
develop a framework for understanding, analyzing, and 
creating ethical private and public policies. I come from 
a strong existential, individualistic, classical liberal, 
and free market perspective. My perspective is strongly 
influenced by the Austrian School of Economics, especially 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek. But, I see this 
as only the starting point: a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the truly civilized society.
Such a society, in my view, requires a well-developed 
character ethic; government limited to protecting the 
society from the coercion and fraud of enemies, foreign and 
domestic; a free market morality; and a vital role 
recognized for an independent sector.30 The challenge, as 
I see it, is not so much to describe what constitutes a 
good life (or how an individual or society should live 
one), but to describe a framework of the individual within 
society that (1) allows a community to approach ethical and
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policy decision-making with a common frame of reference 
emphasizing what is "essentially human," (2) permits the 
rational treatment of those considerations that are 
"ultimate givens"— individual happiness and the production 
of definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions (Mises 
1966, 17-19);31 (3) has room for other ideological 
assumptions not inconsistent with the framework itself; (4) 
encourages them to employ and nurture that which is 
essentially human in all those affected by a judgment; (5) 
suggests the end product of applying such a process without 
suggesting what specific ends should be sought or policies 
adopted at any particular point in time or space; and (6) 
provides a basis for developing transitional rules to 
getting to the desired end state from where the community 
finds itself.
As an ethical (rather than moral, as defined above) 
judgment process, it is designed to take the members of a 
family, organization, or society as we find them. That is 
to say, their preferences, values, beliefs, and capacities 
are to be input into the decision-making process as they 
exist. Thus, the framework permits activities within one 
society, reflecting their values or beliefs or the state of 
their poorly developed capacities, that would be considered 
unethical in another having different values or beliefs or 
better developed capacities. The principal virtue of the 
framework is that it would not be conservative— in the 
sense that it would accept any poorly conceived or
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communicated thought, feeling, or desire as of equal 
dignity with a well-conceived or communicated thought, 
feeling, or desire. Moreover, it would expressly account 
for the impact of any judgment upon the capacities 
themselves.
In addition, I see my starting point as Nietzschean 
in the sense that the Essential Interdependence Paradigm 
chooses to affirm this life in this world, celebrating life 
for what it is and may become, rather than condemning it 
for what it is not, and/or cannot be. Further, it adopts 
his principle of "going beyond good and evil" as a struggle 
for understanding. Hence, honesty and integrity— rooted in 
a firm belief in the need for ever increasing multiples of 
perspective— might be said to be the Essentially Human 
Virtues. Though the framework is designed to achieve 
excellence in living, it rejects violence and slavery as 
necessary conditions for human excellence (see, e.g., 
Ansell-Pearson 1995, 43-44).
My approach is Aristotelian in nature, basing its 
process and policies upon the development, maintenance, and 
employment of certain essentially human traits, 
characteristics and abilities. Unlike the scholastics 
alluded to in Chapter 1, I do not believe that there is an 
"end" or essence to being human that precedes our 
existence. In this sense I am existentialist as described 
by Jean-Paul Sartre in his famous 1945 speech, 
"Existentialism is Humanism" (1945, 1970, 31).
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I expressly reject the utilitarian school in so far as 
it suggests that the end of all ethical and policy judgment 
is toward happiness or pleasure or the greatest good for 
the greatest number. I embrace the Kantian school insofar 
as it embraces rationality, freedom and autonomy, but 
reject its approach to that which is moral as opposed to 
that which is ethical as described above.
Civilization and Intervention
This thesis employs a number of definitions of 
civilization. First, following Robert Nozick and Friedrich 
A. Hayek we may define "the degree of civilization as the 
extent to which we benefit from the knowledge we do not 
ourselves possess" (Nozick 1993, 216 n. 59). Second, 
following Ludwig von Mises, who was describing the 
philosophy of individualism: we may define civilization as 
"social cooperation and the progressive intensification of 
the social nexus" (Mises 1966, 152). The issue, of course, 
is how to achieve civilized society without employing 
coercion or violence. Or, if a society is in such a state 
that the people making it up can see no solution short of 
coercion, then the goal is to apply no more coercion, for 
no longer a period of time, and to no more people, than is
required.32
Throughout this thesis I will make occasional 
reference to "the intervention required" to implement a 
policy, especially one designed to develop and maintain the
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Essential Human Capacities. It should be clearly 
understood that, to a greater or lesser degree, all kinds 
of "intervention" (many generally considered quite 
benevolent) require some degree of coercion. However 
subtle this "intervention" might be, it reduces the 
autonomy of the persons acted upon to that degree. Thus is 
raised the issue of the ethics of intervention (see, e.g., 
Hall 1987, 193-97).33
For the purposes of this thesis, there are four
kinds of intervention: coercion, manipulation, persuasion,
and facilitation. As all categories tend to be, these are
somewhat arbitrary and represent more points along a
spectrum than discrete forms of action. An example of the
spectrum-like nature of them is given by David T. Beito
when he wrote of a medical society and state commission
"offensive to destroy the 'lodge practice1 evil," where
fraternal associations negotiated low per capita annual
fees for its membership. Quoting researchers in the field
(Rosen 1977, 378; Burrows 1977, 128, 131), Beito writes:
The Committee on Contract Work of the Erie County, New 
York medical society recommended "antagonistic 
measures" against the contract practitioner "if 
persuasion fails to convince him of his error." (717)
Most of these terms are self-explanatory, but 
contrasting manipulation, persuasion, and facilitation 
might be instructive. Manipulation is the practice of 
controlling another (by means short of coercion), without 
due regard for the Essential Human Capacities of another.
It has a substantive component in that there is some 
conclusion that the other is expected to reach, or some 
thing to do. By contrast, persuasion is the practice of 
influencing another, with due regard for the Essential 
Human Capacities of another. It likewise has a substantive 
component. Facilitation, on the other hand, has no 
substantive component. While the facilitator may convey 
information of use to the other, facilitation is intended 
to make the process of employing the Essential Human 
Capacities more effective, efficient, and safe: to help 
forward an Essentially Human Judgment Process. Thus, for 
example, mediation, as a process of facilitating the 
resolution of conflict, is more "essentially human" than 
litigation, which has elements of coercion, manipulation, 
and persuasion, and even, sequestration.
State Action as Inherently Coercive
We are not speaking here of the state reserving to 
itself the monopoly of coercion and violence to preserve 
its society from enemies, foreign and domestic, that is,
"to safeguard the smooth functioning of social cooperation" 
(Mises 1966, 722). A basic assumption of an ethics 
characterized by autonomous, rational judgment and action 
is that society and state are essential means for all 
people to attain their unique and private ends (148).
Hence, Mises (though one of the foremost advocates of the 
free market) argues:
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Seen from the point of view of the individual, society 
is the great means for the attainment of all his ends. 
The preservation of society is an essential condition 
of any plans an individual may want to realize by any 
action whatever. Even the refractory delinquent who 
fails to adjust his conduct to the requirements of life 
within the societal system of cooperation does not want 
to miss any of the advantages derived from the division 
of labor. He does not consciously aim at the 
destruction of society.34 (165)
That there could be no mistaking his view of the role of
the state, Mises declares:
The state or government is the social apparatus of 
compulsion and coercion. It has the monopoly of 
violent action. No individual is free to use violence 
or the threat of violence if the government has not 
accorded this right to him. The state is essentially 
an institution for the preservation of peaceful 
interhuman relations. However, for the preservation of 
peace it must be prepared to crush the onslaughts of 
peace-breakers. (149; but see Rothbard 1982)
Rather, when we speak here of intervention, we are speaking
of the application of state power in the public realm, or
manipulation, persuasion or sanction in the private realm,
that are inconsistent with the autonomy of the individual.
Most ideologies presuppose that within the social 
system some figure has power to intervene or abstain from 
intervening in individual and social action. For example, 
parents have power over children, the owner over employees, 
and the state over those within its jurisdiction. If 
"freedom" refers to the sphere within which an acting 
individual is in a position to choose between alternative 
modes of action, one is free insofar as one is able to 
choose ends and the means to be used for the attainment of
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those ends (Mises 1966, 279). Conversely, a figure may be 
said to have "intervened" where this freedom to determine 
one’s fate is restricted, directly or indirectly (287).
This intervention is always of the same kind 
essentially, whether it involves the family, an 
organization, a community, or a nation. It may take the 
form of "rules" of the house, the education of the young, 
the requirement to do chores, and so forth. It may take 
the form of rules of the company; compulsory training, 
education, and development; and limitations on privacy for 
those voluntarily in the employ of an organization. It may 
take the form of health and safety codes in communities; 
mandatory education in public schools; and taxation of 
residents. It may reach its most severe form in a draft 
for the national defense.
One must not lightly accept coercion as legitimate 
intervention, but there are circumstances that suggest that 
it may be appropriate, provided that judgment is made 
conscious of its potentially adverse effects from an 
essentially human point of view. Thus, coercion may be 
appropriate under the following conditions:
1. The situation is such that important values of the 
community (including existence) are threatened;
2. There is insufficient time or opportunity for the 
Essential Human Capacities of those involved or 
affected to be developed and/or employed; and
3. No other form of intervention is reasonably 
possible.
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Finally, if coercion is deemed appropriate and is employed, 
the impact of the coercion upon the Essential Human 
Capacities must be accounted for, as is the case with any 
Essentially Human Judgment Process.
A simple example may illustrate the application of 
these conditions. As Aristotle did from time to time, 
consider the Captain, crew, and passengers aboard a ship at 
sea. Learning that the ship is sinking and the crew has 
manned the lifeboats, you are racing to save yourself when 
you notice that two people are standing on opposite sides 
of the ship. One has apparently panicked and is frozen 
with fear. The other is the Captain of the ship, who has, 
by all appearances, made a conscious decision to honor an 
ancient tradition of the sea and go down with his ship.
For both the passenger and the Captain, important 
values are at stake. For both, existence is at stake, but 
for the Captain there are other values, perhaps even tacit 
knowledge, involved in the tradition of the Captain going 
down with the ship. The contrary value is true for the 
passenger. The Essential Human Capacities of the 
passenger, in this situation, are overwhelmed by panic and 
there is insufficient time to develop or employ them. This 
is not the case for the Captain, who, by all appearances is 
perfectly aware of his or her situation and making a 
considered judgment. By all appearances no other form of 
intervention would succeed in getting the panicked 
passenger into a lifeboat in time to survive. There is not
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time to exercise any other form of intervention with either 
person in any event. Finally, saving the passenger's life 
and subsequent dialogue with him or her might have a 
beneficial effect on the Essential Human Capacities of all 
those involved and affected. At the very least, human 
existence is a sin qua non for their employment.
In this situation, coercion would be appropriate to 
save the passenger's life as it meets all three conditions 
and the impact is accounted for. It would not be 
appropriate, as developed, for the Captain. For human 
beings, there are values higher than mere existence.
Having risen to be a ship's Captain, his or her Essential 
Human Capacities are presumptively well-developed and 
apparently being employed. There is insufficient time or 
opportunity to employ any of the other forms of 
intervention.
I am sensitive to the claim that the framework 
might support intrusions into the lives of human beings 
that are inconsistent with the development, maintenance, 
and/or employment of the Essential Human Capacities in 
general (cf. Hoppe 1989, Chap. 8), or in one country that 
would be considered unconscionable in another country, in 
particular. However, I take comfort in proposing this 
framework as one highly likely, if it were to become a 
framework from which dialogue and discussion started, to 
permit only legitimate intervention— limited in scope and 
duration and to legitimate purpose.
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Conclusion to Part I
These three chapters have raised the challenge and 
problem of ethics and policy decision-making, giving some 
attention to the nature and severity of the problem. They 
have argued that the problem with existing methods is that 
they have not been firmly rooted in an understanding that 
different relationships suggest different approaches to 
understanding. They further suggest that what 
fundamentally unifies various theories of ethics and policy 
study is their requirement for we11-developed, maintained, 
and employed Essential Human Capacities for the theories to 
be well applied.
I have developed and defined certain assumptions 
and concepts that underlie and define the structure of an 
Essentially Human Judgment Process. With these in mind, 
and the need for an "essentially human" judgment framework 
established, I will develop the framework in Part II.
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Chapter Notes/3
1Annette C. Baier (1991), for example, argues that 
David Hume urged "a turn from a one-sided reliance on 
intellect and its methods of proceeding to an attempt to 
use, in our philosophy, all the capacities of the human 
mind: memory, passion, and sentiment as well as a chastened 
intellect" (1; see also Howard 1982, 134-36).
^Lomasky (1987) argues against "autonomy, in its 
extreme form," preferring his own concept of "an 
independent project pursuer" (182-83). For the control of 
consciousness and its relationship to optimal performance 
see Csikszentmihalyi (1991; 1993).
3"Knowing that."
4"Knowing how."
5V. A. Howard (1982), following John Dewey in part, 
points to imagination "as the central element of control in 
an ends-means continuum characteristic of creative 
craftsmanship" (136).
^Note that the first refers to the result of a 
process while the latter is the development of the 
competencies and skills required to apply a process toward 
a result. There is an assumed competence for the first 
"movement" and an assumed incompetence for the second 
"movement" (Senge 1990, 141).
7Creative tension is a positive force, emotional 
tension is a negative force that tends to predispose 
ourselves to lowering the vision (ibid., 150-55).
As Mises (1966) has said in the context of action:
He who acts under an emotional impulse also acts. 
What distinguishes an emotional action from other 
actions is the valuation of input and output. Emotions 
disarrange valuations. Inflamed with passion, man sees 
the goal as more desirable and the price he has to pay 
for it as less burdensome than he would in cool 
deliberation. (17)
^This learning is generative learning which is 
defined as the ability to produce the results we truly want 
in life.
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®See also Nietzsche on art in life and life as an 
aesthetic performance:
Art is valued by Nietzsche for two main reasons; 
firstly, because it enables human beings to endure life 
in the face of the terror and absurdity of existence; 
and secondly, it acts as the great stimulus of life, 
encouraging human beings not to recoil from the horror 
of existence, but to seek its furtherance and perpetual 
self-overcoming. (Ansell-Pearson 1994, 158-59).
l^In an earlier work, Habermas had contrasted the 
"moral questions," that can be dealt with rationally and 
which deal with universalization or justice, and 
"evaluative questions" that can only be dealt with through 
rational discussion within a concrete society and deal with 
questions of the "good life" (White 1988, 48). On the 
difference between the ethical and the moral see also 
Bernard Williams (1985, Chap. 10). On the difference 
between an ethics of justice versus an ethics of care see 
Flanagan and Jackson (1987: 622-37).
H m c Co Ilough (1991) references a number of authors 
who distinguish between:
the moral point of view as that in which one does 
things on principle, universalizes one's principles, 
and considers the good of everyone alike" and "visional 
ethics" [that] has more to do with character, virtue, 
vision, and the stories of the communities that shape 
the moral life. (9)
l^Habermas says these judgments are reached through 
purposive "rationality."
l^Thus, the methodology followed here is 
methodological individualism, singularism, and subjectivism 
(see, e.g., Mises 1966, 41-43 (individualism), 44-46 
(singularism), and 3, 21, 242, 395-96 (subjectivism)).
Methodological individualism is expressly opposed to 
those who believe that the "only adequate method for the 
scientific treatment of human problems is the method of 
universalism and collectivism" (42). Methodological 
individualism holds that the individual human being is a 
social being, but that thinking, feeling, and acting can 
only be understood as individual events:
As a thinking and acting being man emerges from his
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prehuman existence already as a social being. The 
evolution of reason, language, and cooperation is the 
outcome of the same process; there were inseparably and 
necessarily linked together. But this process took 
place in individuals. . . . There is no other substance
in which it occurred than the individuals. (43)
Singularism rejects "universalism, collectivism and 
conceptual realism[, which] see only wholes and universals" 
(45; see also Wilber 1995). Singularism asks:
What happens in acting? What does it mean to say that 
an individual then and there, today and here, at any 
time and at any place, acts? What results if he chooses 
one thing and rejects another? (45)
Subjectivism, in this context, underlies what Mises calls 
the "general science of human action or praxeology.
According to this notion, the only standard that applies is
"whether or not the means chosen are fit for the attainment 
of the ends aimed at" (21).
With regard to the choice of these ends there is no
question of truth; all that matters is value. Value
judgments are necessarily always subjective, whether 
they are passed by one man only or by many men, by a 
blockhead, a professor, or a statesman. (395-96; but 
see Hoppe 1993, Chap. 6)
^Pragmatic judgments should be seen as the purest 
subject of what Mises calls the "Science of Human Action"
or "Praxeology" (Mises 1966, 3, 7, 12, 21, 28-29, 32, 92,
142, 234. It is a central tenet of this thesis that—  
properly understood— ethical and moral judgments deal with 
ultimate ends or values, but always, if the Essential Human 
Capacities are given due consideration, take into 
consideration the agency of all those persons affected by 
the judgment. Ethical judgments take into account people 
as the judgment maker finds them. Some forms of moral 
judgments take into account all such other rational, 
autonomous beings as the judgment maker is best able to 
determine are involved or affected at that point in time 
and space.
l5It is, of course, beyond the scope of this thesis
to consider why, in the heat of decision-making, we do not
follow our own ethical judgments as to what ends or means
are appropriate to pursue or which values to follow (see,
e.g., McIntyre 1990, 379-400; see also M. Smith 1995).
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l^Thus following an Aristotelian notion that "actions 
in accordance with virtue must be essentially pleasant" 
see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 1.8.1099a22).
17This is but one of the three formulations of the 
Kantian categorical imperative. For all three formulations 
of the categorical imperative, see Kant (1785, 1956, 74- 
75).
l^This is a very different formulation from his 
first. Kant's goal in his ethics was autonomy of the 
individual and freedom. The universalization requirement 
was born of rationality, hence his Kingdom of Ends, not an 
application of democracy, in determining what was right.
19I know of no support for Habermas' statement at the 
point cited, nor in any other part of The Groundwork.
20There is, of course, the notion of morality that is 
derived from religious beliefs. Such a distinction would, 
of course, mark a clear distinction between the ethos of a 
given community and the revealed word of God (see, e.g., 
Novak 1993; Neuhaus 1992).
23-The ten consensus core values were reorganized into 
the "Six Pillars of Character" in the 1992 edition.
22The easiest cases, of course, are those where a 
pragmatic judgment is unethical or immoral. As we will see 
in Chapter 8 (Application and Policy Implications), this is 
the typical case in public policy making today.
23por the difference between intentional and 
deliberative perspectives on intentional action see, e.g., 
M. Smith (1995, 131-33).
24This was Nietzsche's (1967) "formula for greatness" 
(10); see also Danto 1965, 21,34, 212-13. for the 
comparable notions in Eastern philosophy see Danto (1987): 
Buddhist theory (81-82) and the Bhagavad Gita (91-93).
25a s to the difference between desiring and valuing 
see M. Smith (1995, 133-36).
2*>rt is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
investigate how closely this approximates the 
"perspectivism" of Nietzsche (but see Danto 1965, Chap. 3; 
Sleinis 1994, Chap. 2).
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2 7 it is beyond the scope of this thesis to treat Ken 
Wilber's (1995) notion of both processes and things 
(products) as "holons" (whole/parts), though it is thought 
provoking and worthy of consideration both supporting and 
limiting the notion of an Essentially Human Judgment 
Process (see. e.g., 35-40).
28j4eehan divides these purposes into three, that he 
terms: anticipation, control, and choice.
^Durkheim— though he believed that neither family, 
religion, nor government could provide the necessary 
"moral" regulation— nonetheless believed that some such 
regulation was required. He proposed a council of 
industrial and professional associations (see Hall 1987, 
Chap. "Social Theory as Intervention"; see also 150-51).
30The latter— a we11-developed independent sector 
taking up where the government has no role and the free 
market either does not or fails to operate— is absolutely 
essential for a society to be truly civilized (see, e.g., 
Cornuelle 1993; Olasky 1992; see also Beito 1990). I leave 
for another day just how 'independent' our independent 
sector is today. See, e.g., Merline (1995):
"We believe that only the government has the resource 
capacity [read power to tax]— not to mention the final 
political and moral responsibility in justice— to 
promote the general welfare," said the Rev. Fred 
Kammer, president of Catholic Charities USA [$1,225 
billion in government grant money, or 65% of revenues 
in 1993], the largest charity in the country [emphasis 
added]." (A1-A2)
31-Mises (1966) notes, for example:
Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the 
external world of physical, chemical, and physiological 
phenomena and the internal world of thought, feeling, 
valuation, and purposeful action. No bridge connects-- 
as far as we can see today— these two spheres.
Identical external events result sometimes in different 
human responses, and different external events produce 
sometimes the same human response. We do not know why. 
(18)
See also Dewey (1929):
Values are values, things immediately having certain
83
intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is 
accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are. 
(321)
33t . Alexander Smith (1988) notes that the 
intervention of government affects the time preferences of 
those affected by the intervention, since short-run gains 
come to be seen as more readily available through such 
intervention than the effort required to make them through 
one's own efforts. This creates rising expectations as to 
the benefits of political action (19, 101-03, 246).
33See also Riane Eisler (1987) who distinguishes 
between "domination hierarchies . . . based upon force or 
the implied threat of force" and "actualization hierarchies 
[whose] function is to maximize the organism's potentials."
[HJuman hierarchies based on force or the threat of 
force not only inhibit personal creativity but also 
result in social systems in which the lowest (basest) 
human qualities are reinforced and humanity's higher 
aspirations (traits such as compassion and empathy as 
well as the striving for truth and justice) are 
systematically suppressed. (205 n. 5)
^Though widely considered one of the champions of 
the free market, Mises (1966) expressly rejected anarchism 
(148-49) and natural law as the foundation for his science 
of human action (174, 720), though he appears to recognize 
a notion of laws of nature expressed in physical phenomena 
and the connectedness between human reason and action (761; 
cf. Rothbard 1982, 205 et seq.; Hoppe 1993, Chap. 6).
PART II
THE ESSENTIAL INTERDEPENDENCE PARADIGM 
CHAPTER 4 
ASSUMPTIONS, CREATIVITY & PARADIGM
The human being faces the world as he or she sees 
it. He or she strives, consciously or unconsciously, to 
recreate it as an aesthetic and/or ethical performance. 
Ultimately, the arts of living as well as can be— toward 
life plans as well-made as can be— are the creative tools 
at issue here. The tasks facing him or her are three-fold: 
to assimilate an already known reality, to accommodate 
himself or herself to a reality at odds to the subject, or 
to transform reality. The issue met by this framework, 
then, is, How does one develop a balanced system of 
assimilation, accommodation, and transformation leading 
from knowledge to action within the context of a world of 
both cultural and natural objects?3
Primary Action-guiding Assumptions
There are a number of primary normative assumptions 
that would lead one to believe that there can be an
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effective ethical and policy judgment process that might 
aptly be labeled "essentially human" and that suggest the 
possible implications for measurement and general policy 
prescriptions. Thus, among the normative assumptions that 
follow, assumptions Al through A10 suggest what the process 
might be; assumptions All through A15 suggest the criteria 
to be employed in determining the essentially humanity of 
the process, judgment, and action taken on them.
A. Assumptions (herein referred to as "A") that point 
to what the process might be:
Al The individual human being is a self-
comprehending, essentially social being whose rational, 
communicative, and social capacities characterize the 
"essentially human" life.
A2 Any essentially human judgment process, and
the product thereof, ought to reflect those capacities 
most characteristically or essentially human.
A3 The specific skills reflecting
characteristically or essentially human capacities are 
critical and creative thinking; communicating in 
symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and 
action.
A4 An essentially human judgment process must
include understanding to grasp what is going on in the 
minds of the persons involved or affected.2 
Understanding [herein referred to as "U"] is important 
because:
U1 It establishes to one's own 
satisfaction the fact that an individual or group of 
individuals engaged in an action— motivated by certain 
value judgments— aimed at certain ends, and that they 
applied for the attainment of these ends means 
suggested by certain technological, therapeutical, and 
praxeological doctrines.
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U2 It tries to appreciate the effects and 
the intensity of the effects brought about by a 
definite action; it tries to assign to every action its 
relevance, i.e., its bearing upon the course of events 
(Mises 1966, 50-55).3
A5 There is a continuity between the acquiring 
of knowledge, the having of knowledge, and the using of 
knowledge. Thus, "knowledge," in the strict sense of 
something possessed, consists of our intellectual 
resources that enable us to adapt the environment to 
our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the 
situation in which we live (Dewey 1916, 344; see also 
Dicker 1976).
A6 Human institutions, practices, and cultures 
are, for the most part, "self-organizing and self- 
replicating structures [that] arise without design or 
even the possibility of design, such that knowledge of 
some of the elements of these structures allows the 
formation of correct explanations about the structure 
(herein referred to as "S") of the whole" (Gray 1984, 
31).  ̂ This principle has three elements:
51 The "invisible-hand" thesis— Social
institutions arise as a result of human action, but not 
always, or wholly, from human design (see, e.g., 
Mandeville 1732, 1924; see also Gray 1984, 33-4; Shand 
1990).
52 The "primacy of tacit or practical
knowledge" thesis— Our knowledge of the world, and 
especially of the social world, is embodied first of 
all in practices and skills, and only secondarily in 
theories, and at least part of this practical knowledge 
cannot be articulated.
53 The "natural selection of competitive
traditions" thesis— Traditions are understood to refer 
to whole complexes of practices and rules of action and 
perception and the claim is that there is a continuous 
evolutionary filtering of these traditions under the 
requirements of adaptability.
A7 The distinctive reasoning of the acting human 
being is that "action necessarily always aims at future 
and therefore uncertain conditions and thus is always 
speculation" (Mises 1966, 58; cf. Dewey 1980, 145; see 
also Dewey 1929, 15).
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A8 The responsibilities of different kinds of
relationships yield different ethical preoccupations, 
methods, priorities, even concepts (Card 1990, 199- 
200).
A9 The Essential Human Capacities tend to be
developed, maintained, and employed more through 
informal and personal relationships than through formal 
impersonal relationships.
A10 Essential Human Excellence is a practice that 
employs the essential human capacities, over time, 
under such conditions, and in such a manner that a 
person develops the ability to master consciousness, 
itself, in order to take control of his or her own 
life.5 There are six necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for essential human excellence (herein 
referred to as "E"):
El Meaningful activity (a bundle of
opportunities for action, or "challenges"), which is 
goal-directed and bounded by clear rules for action;
E2 Skills, knowledge, understanding, and
attitude appropriate to what must be done;
E3 Challenges that are well-matched by a
person's ability to employ the Essential Human 
Capacities;
E4 A situation that provides the
opportunity to become concentrated and involved;
E5 Sufficient feedback to permit a clear
vision, an accurate, insightful view of current 
reality, and reasonable expectations of the 
possibilities of action.
E6 A sense that influencing the creative
process is possible in principle.
B. Assumptions regarding measurement of the essential 
humanity of the process, judgment, and action:
All There is no standard unit for measuring the
desirability of human lives; no single concept or
variable adequately represents human life; each human 
life is, to a greater or lesser degree, unique; and
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preferences and priorities cannot be tested (Meehan 
1990, 111).
A12 Value is the importance that an agent 
attaches to ultimate ends. Means are valued 
derivatively according to their serviceableness in 
contributing to the attainment of ultimate ends. Value 
is not intrinsic; it is not in things. It is within 
us; it is the way in which a person reacts to the 
conditions of his or her environment (Mises 1966, 96).
A13 There are two distinct human capacities to 
measure physical events and human events (herein 
referred to as "K"):®
Kl For physical and chemical events there
exist constant relationships between magnitudes, 
capable of human discovery and measurement with 
precision.
K2 For essentially human events there are
no constant relations between magnitudes capable of 
human discovery and measurement with precision 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.3.1094b21-25; Mises 1966, 55).
A14 Though not constant, the character of a
relationship can be determined and measured to a
relevant degree (hereinafter referred to as "R"):
Rl Formal and impersonal
R2 Informal and personal
R3 Informal and impersonal
A15 Happiness is a consequence of excellence 
and includes, but is not limited to, the following 
feelings (herein referred to as "F"):
Fl A sense of pleasure
F2 A merging of awareness and action
F3 A sense of control of one's life
F4 An altered sense of time, which usually
seems to pass faster, or "timelessly," 
in engrossment or ecstasy
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F5 A sense of harmony and growth
F6 A sense that the experience is worth
doing for its own sake
Creativity and Quality Action
One major definitional task remains, setting the
relationship of the Essential Human Capacities to
creativity, which, for purposes of this thesis, might be
called the "craft" of artistry in life. We will be looking
at what is required to generate or create the lives we
truly desire to live. As V. A. Howard (1982) suggests:
In the end, for artist, artisan, or athlete, it is a 
matter of finding the right response, the "better way" 
of doing things. Practitioners in these areas 
instinctively grasp the significance of critical, 
creative, imaginative skill in the quest for a better 
way, though seldom with the intention of producing a 
better theory of craft. (189; see also Macmurray 1962, 
1992, 14-15)
While this thesis follows the classic distinction 
between the good, the true, and the beautiful, it has as a 
goal the development of a framework to aid us in creating 
the lives we truly want to live— presumptively, lives that 
are subjectively good, true and beautiful. In this vein, 
Richard Shusterman (1992) has interpreted, and expanded 
upon, a cryptic assertion by Ludwig Wittgenstein, that 
"ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" (Ludwig 
Wittgenstein 1921, 1963, 6.421, quoted in Shusterman 1992, 
236). Shusterman believes that Wittgenstein was asserting 
the idea that ethics and aesthetics were fundamentally the
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same in at least three significant respects:
1. Both involve seeing things transcendentally, with 
the whole world as background;
2. Both concern the realm of the mystical as both 
employ a "transcendental global perspective"; and
3. Both are essentially concerned with happiness.
While these hardly establish that ethics and aesthetics are 
"one," they do establish a unifying theme that Shusterman 
developed as pointing to the need for broader perspective 
based upon the world as it is, with a goal of happiness in 
social life.
Shusterman uses Wittgenstein's ambiguous dictum as
a point from which to inquire into the relationship between
ethics and asethetics, concluding by "erecting the
aesthetic as the proper ethical ideal, the preferred model
and criterion for the good life" (Shusterman 1992, 237).
After treating various modern approaches to ethical theory,
he concludes that ethical and aesthetic judgments:
should not be the outcome of strict application of 
rules but the product of creative and critical 
imagination. Ethics and asthetics become one in this 
meaningful and sensible sense; and the project of an 
ethical life becomes an exercise in living 
aesthetically [emphasis added]. (244)
For purposes of the Essential Interdependence
Paradigm, it is assumed that all three capacities are
involved to a greater or lesser degree in creativity. This
is so because, as developed below, creativity is a
systemic, rather than purely individual, accomplishment
91
requiring social capacities.
It is important to distinguish why creativity
should be seen as a function of all three capacities,
rather than simply intelligence. Here, I follow David H.
Feldman, a coauthor of Changing the World: A Framework for
the Study of Creativity (Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and
Gardner 1994) in defining, what he (Feldman 1994) terms,
"'Big' creativity" to mean:
the purposeful transformation of a body of knowledge, 
where that transformation is so significant that the 
body of knowledge is irrevocably changed from the way 
it was before. This kind of transformation can be 
accomplished conceptually, as in the case of proposing 
a new theory, or by making new products or 
representations, developing new technologies, or 
proposing innovative practical techniques. (86)
Thus, when a body of knowledge, or domain, is reorganized,
both qualitatively and irreversibly, creativity is deemed
to have occurred (87).
There are, of course, many other definitions of 
creativity. At first glance, Feldman's notion of 
creativity appears to be too demanding, too far beyond the 
norm to be a model for ethics and policy study for us all, 
and it is. Feldman and his colleagues aimed at Big 
creativity, that is, "the kinds of things that people do 
that change the world" (Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and 
Gardner 1994, 1-2). Their study is expressly not aimed at 
"small' creativity . . ., the more humble (but perhaps 
equally vital) tendency to bring a fresh and lively 
interpretation to any endeavor, whether humble or exalted"
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(2). For purposes of this thesis, we too are seeking 
something more than small creativity, though something less 
than big creativity. We are seeking something that we 
might call "generative activity," the kinds of things that 
people do that create the lives they truly desire to live 
(see Senge 1990, 14, 22, 142, 187, 206, 286).
The kind and degree of creativity in individual
lives has been problematical in the literature, since
aesthetic creation has been considered to be limited to a
narrow elite. Shusterman (1992), for example, treats a
variety of philosophical approaches to creativity,
especially Richard Rorty's (1986; 1989), and tentatively
concludes with Rorty that the aesthetic life is, for the
most part, "a distinctly private ethic, essentially
independent of the public ethics of social life" and that
"no philosophy or theory can synthesize the 'private' goal
of self-creation with the public one of social solidarity"
(Shusterman 1992, 255, quoting and interpreting Rorty 1989,
xiii-xiv). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
develop this debate further, but Shusterman, having
reviewed the theories of Richard Rorty, notes:
Rorty explicity urges us to see the prime value and 
"aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens 
be as privatistic, 'irrationalist,' and asetheticist as 
they please so long as they do it on their own time—  
causing no harm to others and using no resources needed 
by those less advantaged.'" (239)
Shusterman concludes by making an excellent case for a
renewed examination of creativity and its relationship to
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ethics and politics to achieve a notion of "living beauty" 
offering "not so much a final solution but a 'program for 
more work'" (255-61).
The tie between the attribute of human 
consciousness and one's ability to create the life one 
truly desires to live, that is, one's capability to make 
choices and effect changes, is developed in the Feldman, 
Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner (1994) notion that:
The uniquely human ability to reflect upon the 
state of the world and of one's own capabilities and 
make changes in them is perhaps the most dramatic way 
in which humans differ from other organisms.7 (29)
Similar to our discussion of Flow and Essential Human
Excellence, David H. Feldman, Howard Gardner, and Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi declare that their notion of creativity
"assumes a quality of purposefulness, an unusual set of
talents, and probably optimal circumstances for developing
those talents in a distinctive direction" (86). Moreover,
since they consider even a field such as synchronized
swimming to be worthy of study in their work on creativity,
I assume that what I have styled "generative creativity"
must require many of the conditions for creativity they
describe.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop 
fully the tripartite framework of the person, the domain, 
and the field that Feldman and his colleagues have 
developed for further study in the field of human 
creativity, but a few observations are necessary to flesh
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out the notion of Quality Action developed herein. Feldman 
assumes three aspects of the creative person: "a quality of 
human purposefulness, an unusual set of talents, and 
probably optimal circumstances" (1994, 86). First, to 
Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner (1994), creativity 
is purposeful:
an ability to reflect on experience, both from inside 
and outside the skin, as well as a tendency to believe 
in the possibility of making changes to better achieve 
ends. (31)
Second, Feldman (1994, 86) assumes an unusual set of 
talents. This would be for purposes of big creativity.
For the purposes of the Essential Human Paradigm, the 
minimum required talents include well-developed (or 
facilitated) Essential Human Capacities, a cognitive 
orientation toward discovery, and intrinsic motivation 
(see, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi 1994, 147).8 Third, Feldman 
(1994, 86) assumes optimal circumstances. Later, 
Csikszentmihalyi (1994, 135) suggests that these optimal 
circumstances include being part of a creative system, "the 
social and cultural context in which the "creative" person 
operates."
Thus, creativity is a systemic phenomenon:
But even in the best of cases, when real-life adult 
accomplishments are evaluated by experts, judgments are 
based on criteria that cannot be separated from current 
values and norms. Hence one must conclude that 
creativity is not an attribute of individuals but of 
social systems making judgments about individuals.
(144)
For the most part, then, all attempts of the human being to
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develop knowledge and act upon it in order to assimilate, 
accommodate, or transform reality is essentially a systemic 
function.
Csikszentmihalyi (1994) lists a number of questions 
that help describe the impact of the field, or community, 
on creativity. These may be stated, in terms of the 
Essential Interdependence Paradigm, to be:
1. Is the main concern of the community to preserve or 
change the community?
2. How many variations is the community equipped to 
recognize?
3. What are its resources for controlling the rate of 
individual variations?
4. What are its selection criteria concerning new 
variations?
5. What is the status of the community relative to 
other communities in the social system?
6. Is the community autonomous, made up of persons 
controlling their own destiny, or is it controlled by 
external institutions? (152)
Since human institutions rise and develop through 
human action, but not always or wholly through human 
design, there is a predictable, though perhaps 
unquantifiable, loss in human creativity when a minority of 
a community arrogates to itself the right to set standards 
for creativity, which interferes with the creativity of 
individuals. To this list, then, should be added the 
question, To what extent is human creativity stifled by the 
control of the community?
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For purposes of the Essential Interdependence 
Paradigm, therefore, generative creativity is assumed to be 
a fundamental aspect of Quality Judgment, but neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition of any particular 
judgment. Generative creativity involves a quality of 
human purposefulness that impels the individual to create 
the life he or she truly desires to live. This, in turn, 
requires that the individual's Essential Human Capacities 
are well enough developed and employed to be able to 
effectively assimilate, accommodate or transform the world 
around him or her. Finally, he or she must have surrounded 
him or herself with a supportive community.
Essential Interdependence Paradigm.
This framework of the individual within society, 
which employs and accounts for the Essential Human 
Capacities, is called the Essential Interdependence 
Paradigm. It stands in contrast to any number of other
paradigms that treat the individual as a subordinate part
of society (see, e.g., Giddens 1971; Etzioni 1988) or which 
make unreasonable assumptions regarding human capacities, 
especially knowledge. The Essential Interdependence 
Paradigm refers to the processes and policy considerations 
necessary to the use and development of those capacities of
agents acting within society, which are "of the essence" of
humanity and which, correspondingly, are "essential" to 
living the good life in society, irrespective of how one
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defines it. It includes what is called an Essentially 
Human Judgment Process and the impact of pursuing such a 
process within a community over time. This framework can 
be expressed verbally as follows:
Where a judgment process (as far as is reasonably 
possible) employs— and accounts for the effects of a 
proposed judgment on— the Essential Human Capacities of 
all persons affected by a judgment, there results 
Quality Judgment. The judgment process itself will 
consider (a) the time available to employ the process, 
(b) the time frame(s) within which the judgment is to 
be effective, and (c) the differing time value 
orientations of all those affected.
Where Quality Judgment is implemented by persons 
for whom the project is a meaningful activity and there 
is a balance of challenge and ability; an opportunity 
for concentration and involvement; sufficient feedback 
to permit a clear vision, an accurate, insightful view 
of current reality, and reasonable expectations of the 
possibilities of action; and a sense of the possibility 
of control of one's life, there results Quality Action. 
The action process itself must provide enough time for 
the actors (a) to employ their Essential Human 
Capacities in reaching augmenting Quality Judgments,
(b) to implement the resulting Quality Judgments, and
(c) to reflect on the experience in order to consider 
its long-term impacts and learn from it.
If the norms of Quality Judgment and Quality Action 
are followed over long enough periods of time, there 
results change in behavior, and, if the changed 
behavior becomes the custom of the community, there 
result autonomous agents of good character, who embrace 
uncertainty and change as opportunities for learning 
and growth and who comprise a community having shared 
vision and core values consistent with the development 
and maintenance of the Essential Human Capacities.
The Essential Interdependence Paradigm requires 
diligent accounting for the development and employment of 
the Essentially Human Capacities of all those affected 
thereby. This standard applies no matter what the type of
judgment (e.g., moral, ethical, or pragmatic), what part in 
the management process the judgment is made (e.g., path- 
finding, problem-solving, or implementing)(see Leavitt 
1989, 33-42).  ̂or whether it is the judgment process, the 
judgment itself, the implementation process, or the 
consequences upon implementation that are to be evaluated. 
Under such a system, the process and policy are integrated: 
that which characterizes the process, also characterizes 
the policy. Finally, the process and its judgments are 
parts of a framework of human action within society that 
aids in understanding past human events and in projecting 
future human events and their consequences. It allows 
ethical and policy judgments to reflect the life-histories 
and life-worlds of the decision-makers while applying 
universalistic norms, essentially rational, to the 
procedure itself and to the policy insofar as it affects 
the capacities of those affected by the judgment (Habermas 
1993, 171-72). In short, it allows the individual to 
assimilate, accommodate, or transform more successfully the 
world he or she sees.
Conclusion and Preview
I have described the basic assumptions underlying 
the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, with a special 
emphasis on creativity, and described the framework itself. 
I turn now to a brief description of the capacities that I 
assume, for purposes of this thesis, to be "Essential Human
Capacities" in Chapter 5, and of the various aspects of 
time and the concepts of Quality Judgment and Quality 
Action in Chapter 6.
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Chapter Notes/4
^This approach is based upon the Feldman adaptation 
of Piaget's theory of equilibration of knowledge (Feldman 
1994).
^Mises distinguishes between knowledge of physical 
phenomenon, conception, and understanding (Mises 1966, 50). 
A related aspect of knowledge is the concept of "tacit 
knowledge" or "fragmented knowledge" (see, e.g., Gray,
1984, 28, 37, 82-83).
^Mises (1966) declares, e.g., "Acting man looks, as 
it were, with the eyes of a historian into the future"
(58).
^This is based upon the notion that knowledge is 
essentially practical knowledge. As such it is embedded in 
practices, institutions, language, habits, customs, and 
traditions. Much of it is only dimly understood and cannot 
be articulated. So, theory, models, and frameworks such as 
this one, can never be more than abstract and speculative 
as to what patterns have occurred in the past, and might 
occur in the future.
^For the control of consciousness and its 
relationship to optimal performance see Csikszentmihalyi 
(1991; 1993).
6It is assumed that there are three dimensions of 
experience: perceptual objects that are really existing 
things or events; all other objects that may or may not 
exist, may have existed but no longer exist, and that do 
not exist but may exist in the future; and the subjective 
experiences that exist only for the individual mind that 
has them (Adler 1985, 29).
7This supports the notion that such reflection or 
consciousness might be considered an "essential" human 
capacity or attribute. For the purposes of this thesis, it 
will be considered the capacity that compels the 
development of the Essential Human Capacities, or an 
attribute of humanity, which requires the capacities to be 
developed itself.
^Csikszentmihalyi (1994) discusses the relationship 
between personality traits and values, cognitive 
orientation toward discovery, and intrinsic motivation in 
"The Domain of Creativity." He also refers to discovery 
orientation as "problem finding orientation" (147). In a
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related vein regarding problem definition, see Rochefort 
and Cobb (1994).
^According to Leavitt: implementing is about "acting, 
changing, doing"; problem-solving is about "analysis, 
thought, reason"; and path-finding is about "vision, 
innovation, mission" (Leavitt 1989, 34).
CHAPTER 5
CAPACITIES CONCEPTUALIZED
Capacities Characterized as 
"Essentially Human"
The first capacity among equally "essentially 
human" capacities would seem to be critical and creative 
thinking. This capacity is best employed, however, (and 
perhaps only we11-employed) within a context of social 
cooperation in the form of effective communication and 
cooperative inquiry and action among and between all those 
involved in, and affected by, a judgment of quality. Thus, 
we will discuss the other two capacities— communicating in 
symbols and concepts, and cooperating in inquiry and 
action— before turning to critical and creative thinking.
Significance of symbolic communication
Symbolic communication can be seen as an 
essentially (though not exclusively)1 human process for two 
reasons: (a) the individual human develops his or her 
"sense of self" within the broader community through 
symbolic communication and (b) the human environment, as 
opposed to the physical environment, is the construction of 
communicating humans.
102
103
The human becomes "human," in the sense of being
self-conscious, through language. This first concept is
best illustrated by the work of George Herbert Mead, as
interpreted by Jurgen Habermas (1991):
A person is a personality because he belongs to a 
community, because he takes over the institutions of 
that community into his own conduct. He takes its 
language as a medium by which he gets his personality, 
and then through a process of taking the different 
roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the 
attitude of the members of the community. (159)
Thus, Habermas declares that:
The formation of identity and the emergence of 
institutions can now be approached along the following 
lines: the extralinguistic context of behavioral 
dispositions and schemes is in a certain sense 
permeated by language, that is to say, symbolically 
restructured. Previously, only instruments for 
reaching understanding were transformed into signals, 
into signs with conventionally fixed meanings; at the 
stage of normatively guided action, however, the 
symbolism permeates even into motivation and the 
behavioral repertoire. It creates both subjective 
orientations and suprasubjective orientation systems, 
socialized individuals, and social institutions. (160)
The human environment is a construct of 
communication. The notion of communicating in symbols and 
concepts ties together a number of concepts. First, human 
action is purposeful behavior aiming at the attainment of 
definite ends (Mises 1966, Chap. I) and based upon each 
human being's subjective understanding of experience^ and 
the meaning each ascribes to a thing or event. Second, 
human beings are "capable of argumentation and hence know 
the meaning of truth and validity" (Hoppe 1993, 152).
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Third, while the meaning is, in some sense, unique to each 
individual, the words with which we think are a social 
phenomenon^ and the significance of things and events are 
the result, in large part, of our social interactions. 
Fourth, meaning is a function of perception, reason, and 
understanding. To understand a thing or event, each 
individual must perceive it and make use of all the 
knowledge "provided by logic, mathematics, the natural 
sciences" and his or her understanding of the meanings 
other individuals placed on the thing (Mises 1966, 49). 
Thus, the meaning of any thing is open to change in the 
mind of the individual as his or her knowledge and 
experience affect his or her understanding.4
Even so basic a human physical characteristic as 
speech, has ethical implications.5 As Ernest Barker 
observes, the human "faculty of speech . . .  is not only 
the basis of justice; it is an impulse towards good 
fellowship and sociability" (Barker 1959, 267). Thus, the 
entirety of human nature, including our capacities for 
speech, for sociability, and ultimately for reasoning is 
inseparably a part of our nature and, thus, our end, 
happiness being the exercise of the best part of the human 
being to the extent possible. Indeed, while happiness (in 
its common use) can be found along a continuum between 
brute pleasure on the low end and contemplation of the gods 
on the high end, the animal pleasures in which we may
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indulge at the low end of the continuum are too far removed 
from the ergon of the human being for them to constitute 
the life of the individual in the polis.
With the foregoing in mind, the framework will 
employ the following results-oriented definition of 
communication:
Communicating in symbols and concepts is that mutually
purposeful, reflectively open process that results in
understanding, consensus, appreciation, illumination, 
resolution, and elevation.
Cooperative Inquiry
The philosophical view supporting the notion of
cooperative inquiry, especially in a structured "community
of inquiry," is perhaps best set forth by Matthew Lipman, a
modern pioneer in justifying philosophy as a core subject
in early education.® Lipman1s case for cooperative
inquiry, which he often refers to as a "community of
inquiry," is justified philosophically, and pursued, in a
context of philosophically oriented readings. His
philosophical justification lies in the notion that
Socrates' admonition, "Know thyself," was, in practice,
accomplished through "shared inquiry as a way of life."
Thus, in contrast to typical academic or theoretical
interchange, Lipman (1988, 14, 16-17) argues that the
"Socratic Method" should be:
the continued prosecution of philosophical inquiry by 
following the reasoning wherever it leads (confident 
that, wherever it leads, wisdom lies in that
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direction), not the heavy breathing and clanging of 
armor in dialectical battles, where the premium is not 
on insight but on victory. (14)
Inquiry, following the Socratic way of life, is 
"perseverance in self-corrective exploration of issues that 
are felt to be both important and problematic (20)." The 
community of inquiry is a number of persons "committed to 
self-corrective exploration and creativity," who together 
form "a reflective community that thinks in the disciplines 
about the world and about its thinking about the world," 
though thinking is always done by individuals (Lipman 1988, 
20; Mises 1966, 177). Moreover, in theory, a network of 
interconnected and/or nested communities of inquiry, each 
pursuing the problematic issues of importance to itself and 
all holding "the same allegiance to the same procedures of 
inquiry" will come to form ever more inclusive such 
communities (20).
Though speaking primarily to educators, and 
frequently urging the study of philosophy as the means of 
developing "reasonableness" as opposed to rationality, 
Lipman gives a picture in the educational context of the 
conduct of a community of inquiry. Lipman urges:
converting the classroom into a community of inquiry, 
where students and teachers can talk together as 
persons and as members of the same community, where 
they can read together, appropriate ideas together, 
build on one another's ideas as well as think 
independently, [become profoundly aware of how much 
they can learn from other participants with whom they 
strongly disagree]. (42)
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In such an environment, he maintains, participants wills
seek reasons for their views, explore their 
presuppositions, so as to bring into their lives a 
fresh sense of what it is to discover, to invent, to 
interpret, and to criticize. (42)
Ultimately, according to him, such:
A place [where the spoken dialogue among the members of 
the class, when internalized and rendered an inner 
forum in the mind of the participant, is the basis of 
the process known as thinking.] (11)
Fundamental to the Community of Inquiry is the 
ability to self-correct, not only in the sense of 
correction of error, but in the sense of correction of 
partiality. In this sense, the Community of Inquiry can be 
perceived as a device to develop good moral character, the 
ability to inquire and act cooperatively, and a strong 
sense of mutually supportive community founded upon 
cooperative inquiry and cooperative action. As Lipman 
describes the process:
To correct the partiality of what is gained by 
observing from a single perspective, we must take into 
account what is observed from other perspectives, and 
still others. The greater the number of perspectives, 
the greater the comprehensiveness of information and 
evidence, and the more we move in the direction of 
impartiality. Thus inquiry is necessarily 
perspectival, social, and communal.7 (148)
Taking a system's view of a problem requires 
cooperative inquiry. David Bohm, as interpreted by Peter 
M. Senge in The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of 
the Learning Organization (1992), bases his work on the 
theory and practice of dialogue on the quantum theory of
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physics, which:
implies that the universe is basically an indivisible 
whole, even though on the larger scale it may be 
represented approximately as divisible into separately 
existing parts. In particular, this means that at a 
quantum theoretical level of accuracy, the observing 
instrument and the observed object participate in each 
other in an irreducible way. At this level perception 
and action therefore cannot be separated. (242-43)
Thus, at the bottom of the notion of cooperative inquiry
are "two major intellectual currents":
the systems or holistic view of nature and the 
interactions between our thinking and internal "models" 
and our perceptions and actions. (239)
Applying the electron sea as metaphor, Bohm asserts that:
we must look on thought as a systemic phenomena [sic] 
arising from how we interact and discourse with one 
another. (240)
Bohm further refines our notion of effective
communication to distinguish between two primary types of
discourse: dialogue and discussion. For Bohm, the
preferred type is "dialogue," that is,
meaning passing or moving through . . .  a free flow of 
meaning between people, in the sense of a stream that 
flows between two banks. (249)
The principal benefit of dialogue is that a community
"accesses a larger 'pool of common meaning,' which cannot
be accessed individually" (240-41). In dialogue, the
complex phenomena that are human affairs and human events
are explored by a community from many points of view. For
Bohm, "collective learning is not only possible but vital
to realize the potentials of human intelligence":
109
Through dialogue people can help each other to become 
aware of the incoherence in each other's thoughts, and 
in this way the collective thought becomes more and 
more coherent. . . .  It is difficult to give a simple 
definition of coherence, beyond saying that one may 
sense in it as order, consistency, beauty, or harmony.8 
(242-43)
There are three specific conditions that are 
necessary for dialogue, according to Bohm:
1. All participants must "suspend" their assumptions, 
literally to hold them "as if suspended before us";
2. All participants must regard one another as 
colleagues;
3. There must be a "facilitator" who "holds the 
context" of dialogue. (243)
Senge adds a fourth condition that provides that dialogue
and discussion must be balanced. In Senge's view,
"discussion is the necessary counterpart of dialogue"
(247). Senge distinguishes dialogue from discussion as
follows:
In dialogue, different views are presented as a means 
toward discovering a new view. In a discussion, 
decisions are made. In a dialogue, complex issues are 
explored. . . . When they are productive, discussions 
converge on a conclusion or course of action. On the 
other hand, dialogues are diverging; they do not seek 
agreement, but a richer grasp of complex issues. (247)
This notion of the community of inquiry, or
cooperative inquiry, can be seen to be fundamental to basic
concepts of the Austrian school of economics, probably the
foremost proponent of free markets and limited government
interference in economic and social affairs. To my
knowledge, no such explicit "Austrian" case for cooperative
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inquiry has been made, though the case for cooperative 
action is "of the essence" of the Austrian paradigm. But, 
in my view, a realistic view of human knowledge lends 
itself as support for the crucial importance of cooperative 
inquiry and the Austrian claims for free markets, 
especially as advanced by Friedrich A. Hayek.
To Hayek, the central economic problem has to do 
"not with the efficient utilization of scarce resources, 
but rather with the generation and utilization of dispersed 
knowledge" (Gray 1984, 82-83). At bottom, only a system 
that permits genuinely cooperative inquiry and cooperative 
action can avoid the Prisoner's Dilemma "in which agents 
acting severally produce a situation which thwarts their 
goals and harms their interests" (121).
Within a community sharing such understanding, a
diversity of individual, group, and intergroup cultures is
to be encouraged. But, as T. Alexander Smith proposes,
"congruence between the demands of temporality, diversity
of values, and institutional arrangements" must be achieved
for the community to remain stable or progress. Smith
(1988) suggests that these demands can be:
most likely achieved (1) when social norms and values 
are oriented more strongly to future ends than to 
present gratification; (2) when free markets 
predominate in economic life; and (3) when the "rule of 
law" and clearly defined policy rules govern the 
political community. (9)
While the policy implications drawn from the essentially
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human judgment process suggest a similar formula for public 
policy, it is not the purpose of either the Essentially 
Human Judgment Process or the Essential Interdependence 
Paradigm to reach that result. Rather, it is the sole 
purpose of the process to encourage as much human 
cooperation in the form of inquiry and action as is 
reasonably possible. It is true that I believe that a 
transition to a state similar to that espoused by Smith 
above will tend to result as one takes into account, uses 
and develops the human capacities of the persons affected 
by a judgment, both in the judgment process and upon 
implementation. Thus, in my view— at a faster or slower 
rate depending upon the individual, group and intergroup 
cultures— if an Essentially Human Judgment Process is 
undertaken, the policy implications will suggest and impose 
themselves.
Finally, and in a related vein, Smith proposes that 
individual, group, and intergroup cultures be analyzed in 
terms of its ideological (meanings, values, norms), 
behavioral, and material aspects (206) with particular 
attention given to whether these three aspects are 
"integrated, nonintegrated, or indeed quite contradictory 
to one another." From a policy point of view, it is 
perhaps more helpful to think of this integration as 
another situation where congruence should be tested. Thus, 
paraphrasing two of Smith's definitions, in the Essentially
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Human Judgment Process:
we are concerned with "cultural congruence," that is, 
that any meanings, values and norms regarding purposive 
actions under the judgment be objectified or 
objectifiable in the overt behaviors and material 
vehicles of individuals and groups. (206, 207)
With these views in mind, this framework will 
employ a definition of cooperative inquiry and action as 
follows:
Cooperating in inquiry and action is concerted critical 
and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and 
concepts; and action aiming at the attainment of common 
ends, together with an understanding of how to 
complement one another's efforts, including, but not 
limited to, cooperative action aiming at the free and 
creative exploration of complex and subtle issues.
Role of the Facilitator in 
the Community of Inquiry
As noted above, Bohm and Senge point to the
essential role of the facilitator to keep the cooperative
inquiry on track. If we think of the teacher as being a
facilitator of the community rather than as an
"informational authority," Lipman (1988) provides for the
following role:
[T]he teacher must always take ultimate responsibility 
for establishing those arrangements that will guide and 
nudge the class into more and more productive, more and 
more self-corrective discursive inquiry. The teacher 
must always be on alert for illogical conduct among the 
students, just as a person chairing a meeting must be 
alert to any possible transgression of the rules of 
parliamentary procedure. But even here the teacher 
need not rule with a heavy hand.9 (97)
Significantly, from the perspective of the Essentially
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Human Judgment Process, facilitation is an intervention 
that encourages the employment of the Essential Human 
Capacities of all those involved or affected.
Critical and Creative Thinking
Critical and creative thinking is purposefully, yet 
paradoxically, the last developed of the Essential Human 
Capacities. It is the process that receives the most 
attention in books on policy analysis or problem-solving, 
yet it is highly dependent upon the other two capacities 
for it to be effective. Indeed, it is precisely because 
the current processes focus upon thinking to the relative 
ignoring of symbolic communication and cooperative inquiry, 
they invariably become focused upon the thought process and 
assume away problems of knowledge and understanding. Most 
processes that require the consideration of other points of 
view and the challenging of assumptions, inferences, and 
implications do not emphasize would constitute adequate 
communication or encourage the forming of a community of 
inquiry (but see Paul 1992; Lipman 1991).
Though thinking is always done by the individual,10 
thinking that leads to judgment affecting others, that is 
conducted without due regard for communication and 
cooperative inquiry, cannot help being deficient in its 
grasp of facts and understanding of human events. In 
short, in a world of uncertainty, one thinking in isolation
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cannot hope to understand the human events of the past or 
present or their relevance to the future.
Critical and creative thinking is that purposeful, 
intuitive, imaginative and self-regulatory process that 
results in interpretative, analytical, evaluative, 
inventive and constructive judgments, together with a 
sound explanation of the evidential, conceptual, 
understanding, systemic or methodological 
considerations upon which they are based.
Of the essence of critical and creative thinking within a
judgment process is the need to reach a comprehensive
understanding of the human events involved and the points
of view of all those involved or affected by the judgment
process and the judgment (see, e.g., Paul 1992, 240-318).
Critical and creative thinking within an 
essentially human judgment process is highly dependent upon 
symbolic communication and is generally most effective when 
employed within a community of cooperative inquiry.
Whether or not critical and creative thinking is performed 
individually or in a group depends upon the time available 
or the context within which the judgment is to be made, for 
example, a leader may ultimately form the judgment after 
individual reflection, or one placed in a difficult ethical 
position may not be able to involve others in making a 
judgment. Regardless of the circumstances, critical and 
creative thinking within the essentially human judgment 
process is still employed.
115
Bringing it All Together
There is a skill and knowledge component that
integrates critical and creative thinking and dialogue and
discussion. The foregoing can be brought together if the
Essential Human Capacities are applied effectively and
efficiently in a systematic way. Thus, for example,
provided an otherwise "essentially human" process is used
in ethical and policy study, a structured approach, such as
Michael Scriven's (1976) "Seven Steps in Argument Analysis"
integrates the employment of the Essential Human Capacities
(39-53).11
As Scriven argues:
Learning a new jargon or some technical calculus would 
give you a sense of having learned something, but it 
would not teach you something useful for . . . the 
assessment and presentation of everyday arguments. So 
remember that the trick here is to do a familiar task 
better, not to learn a new terminology for talking.
(39)
Having said this, however, it also true that, even the 
prospects of doing a familiar task better, will be greatly 
enhanced where the social aspects of critical and creative 
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and 
cooperating in inquiry and action are appreciated.
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Chapter Notes/5
•^Marine mammals and great apes may also communicate.
^Mortimer J. Adler (1985) asserts that there are 
three dimensions of experience:
Perceptual objects that are really existing things 
or events;
All other objects that may or may not exist, may 
have existed in the past but no longer exist, or that 
do not exist at present but may exist in the future; 
and
The subjective experiences that exist only for the 
individual mind that has them. (29)
^Mises (1966) observes:
As a thinking and acting being man emerges from his 
prehuman existence already as a social being. The 
evolution of reason, language, and cooperation is the 
outcome of the same process; they were inseparably and 
necessarily linked together. But this process took 
place in individuals. (43)
^Things are ultimately merely means toward ends which 
humans aim at. As such, the meaning of a thing to an 
individual is a function of the values derivatively placed
on a thing as a means to an end.
5Aristotle wrote:
For nature . . . does nothing without a purpose; and 
man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere 
voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and
therefore is possessed by other animals as well . . .,
but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and 
the harmful, and therefore also the right and the 
wrong; for it is the special property of man in 
distinction from the other animals that he alone has 
perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the 
other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these 
things that makes a household and a city-state. 
(Politics 1.1.1253al7-18)
6Lipman is only the "modern" proponent because, at
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least as early as Plato and Aristotle, the notion of 
treating serious subjects for children through play, which 
I read to mean, at bottom, their voluntary and guided, but 
otherwise self-directed, efforts at understanding and 
relating to the world around them as individuals and as a 
community.
7 For purposes of this treatise, this is considered to 
be a search for shared vision, rather than for uniformity 
or conformity.
8Whitehead (1938) declares that:
Morality is always aimed at that union of harmony, 
intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection 
of importance for that occasion. (14)
^Lipman gives a number of examples of what would 
defeat the "heavy hand":
He or she may ask the other students whether, for 
example, a remark was, in their opinion, relevant; 
whether an inference made did, in fact, follow 
logically from the premises that had been established; 
whether the most useful method of construing terms was 
being utilized; or whether they agreed with the 
assumptions that apparently underlay [sic] the 
speaker's assertions. (97)
lOThat is, there may be joint acting, but there is no 
joint thinking (Mises 1966, 177-78).
ll-This raises the issue, beyond the scope of this 
thesis, as to the proper balance between didactically 
teaching about the structure of such an approach and 
experiencing the community of inquiry. It is a difficult 
balance for the "facilitator" to reach since topic 
development, process guidance, modeling, facilitation, and 
even leadership are necessary for the successful community 
of inquiry, yet each role tends to detract from what the 
other roles have to add to the community. See, e.g., 
Gardner (1995).
CHAPTER 6
ELEMENTS OF TIME AND CONCEPTS OF 
QUALITY JUDGMENT AND ACTION
Time in General
In developing or employing the Essential Human 
Capacities, "time" remains an important, often critical, 
factor both as to the time available to form a judgment 
(see, e.g., T. Smith 1988; McIntyre 1990, 390), the time 
periods applicable,^ and the time preferences of all those 
involved or affected (Mises 1966, Chap. V). Essential 
elements in any Essentially Human Judgment Process are the 
time available to acquire the needed knowledge, to employ 
the process, to implement the judgment, to reconsider or 
reevaluate the solution implemented, and to so habituate 
the individuals in a community that the process becomes 
custom (see, e.g., Burnyeat 1990, 69-92).2 Moreover, time 
figures as a factor in reaching judgment in terms of the 
time frame over which the judgment is to be implemented and 
the value orientation of the individuals affected as to 
time.^
Though not a skill as such, the various aspects of 
time must be understood and treated as factors integral to
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the employment of the Essential Human Capacities. As T. 
Alexander Smith (1988) declares:
We ignore the constraints which time places upon us at 
our collective peril. Human beings necessarily act 
through time, so its mere passage has important 
consequences for individuals and societies alike. In 
particular, our plans for the more or less distant 
future are likely to go awry, since we perforce make 
choices without prior knowledge and current information 
about what others have done, are doing, and will do.
Our social worlds are accordingly uncertain and 
unpredictable. (239)
Smith points out that time also has a function in
the uncertainty that surrounds us all:
Moreover, since each of us possesses a different stock 
of knowledge accumulated through earlier experiences, 
our imagined futures will likewise diverge. Were any 
two individuals to call somehow upon similar 
experiences, it by no means follows that their 
interpretations of the future would lead each to form 
similar expectations about the course of subsequent 
events. We are thus doomed to live with uncertainty 
and unpredictability. (ibid.)
A related time function is the notion of time 
preference and its impact upon human judgment. All 
purposeful action is made with reference to time 
preference, i.e., any thing desired, ceteris paribus, is 
preferred sooner rather than later. As a result, the time 
preferences of the persons affected by a judgment will 
affect their valuation of the various ends sought, and 
derivatively, the means to those ends (Mises 1966, 99-104, 
483-90, 499-512). The impact of time preference is so 
significant that Smith declares that:
It follows that policies whose benefits are indirect, 
and which occur in the long run, will receive far less
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support than those policies which are experienced in 
the present, whose expected impacts are direct, and 
which take place in the present. (99)
There is, of course, more involved than time preference in
policies that emphasize the more immediate and the more
direct impacts. The very nature of politics, especially in
a democracy, may well reflect more the intensity of the
interests involved in the public policy-making process,
themselves a function of time preference and self-interest,
than a short-term time preference in the process as a
whole. Our challenge is to develop a framework that
overcomes myopia, parochialism, and impulsiveness.
Time and the Essential Interdependence Paradigm
The Essential Interdependence Paradigm has seven 
time considerations at three distinct points therein:
1. The amount of time available to the judgment 
formulators;
2. The time frame(s) within which the judgment is to 
be effective, i.e., short-term, medium-term, and 
long-term;
3. The value orientation forming the basis of the 
judgment: past, present, or future;
4. The amount of time available to use Quality 
Judgment during the implementation phase;
5. The amount of time available to implement the 
Judgment;
6. The time available to reflect upon, and learn from, 
the action, and
7. The period of time over which an individual and/or 
community exercises the Essential Human Capacities 
so as to habituate the individual and/or community
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so that it becomes a custom.
Quality Judgment and Quality Action
For purposes of this process, and by definition, 
Quality Judgment is that which results from employing the 
above process, which includes (but is not limited to) 
choices, decisions, plans, policies, and visions (see also 
Yankelovich 1991, 24, 38). A more precise description of 
Quality Judgment, as a product, might be as follows;
Quality Judgment results when one (as far as is reasonably 
possible) has acquired comprehensive understanding of a 
matter; is able to make a clear statement of the conditions 
that must be met for success; accepts responsibility for 
the judgment; and remains open to reevaluating it.
For purposes of this process, and by definition, 
Quality Action results when implementing a Quality Judgment 
with sufficient time and latitude that the agents 
implementing the judgment, and all those affected thereby, 
are able to employ (as far as is reasonably possible) their 
Essential Human Capacities in cooperative action. A more 
precise definition of Quality Action might be as follows; 
Quality Action results when one (as far as is reasonably 
possible) acts upon a Quality Judgment with comprehensive 
understanding of its impact on all those affected thereby; 
is able to form appropriate Quality Judgments in order to 
implement the original judgment; engages in cooperative 
action with those persons affected by the action; and
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accepts responsibility for his or her part therein.
Quality Judgment 
A Quality Judgment may be any one of two general 
types: path-finding and problem-solving. Each is designed 
to answer different questions. Path-finding questions are: 
What is the good life? What visions do I have for the 
future? What expectations can I have for the possibilities 
of future action? What is the problem? What is my 
mission? Problem-solving questions are more common: What 
can I do to make the hurt go away? What can I do to bring 
my reality closer to my vision?
Quality Judgment is not static; it is the result of 
a continuous process of employing the Essential Human 
Capacities in cooperative inquiry, preferably in a 
community or communities of inquiry. An agent making a 
Quality Judgment must be willing and able to adjust the 
judgment to new understandings or events and know when an 
adjustment strays too far from the community's 
understanding of the complex issues upon which the judgment 
was based.
Quality Action 
Quality Judgment is as static as necessary for 
action to be taken, but as dynamic as necessary for the 
action taken to be cooperative rather than merely commanded 
or coordinated.4 Thus, Quality Action results when
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sufficient time and latitude are afforded the implementors 
such that they are able to make those Quality Judgments 
necessary to "flesh out" the original Quality Judgment.
Quality Action is to be distinguished from 
commanded action or coordinated action. For purposes of 
this thesis, commanded action is directive in nature; it 
may require little or no critical and creative thinking; 
communicating in symbols and concepts; or cooperating in 
inquiry or action. Coordinated action is also directive in 
nature as people are told what to do, but it typically 
requires some critical and creative thinking within the 
rules pronounced and some communication and joint action 
between people is possible. Quality Action (as far as is 
reasonably possible) is cooperative action, that is, it is 
not directed, it has strong informal elements and requires 
a high degree of critical and creative thinking; 
communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in 
inquiry and action. Thus, for Quality Action, each agent 
must cooperatively implement that part of a judgment for 
which he or she is responsible while adjusting to reality 
as he or she sees it, which includes how one's colleagues 
are adjusting to the environment as they see it.
At first glance, this definition of Quality Action 
may seem to preclude the autonomous action of the 
craftsman, innovator, or "rugged individual." On 
reflection, however, Quality Action can be seen to include 
the truly autonomous agent. First, in the narrower sense,
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the definition is qualified by the condition "as far as is 
reasonably possible." Thus, certain "quality" actions may 
have to be performed in isolation. But, in the broader 
sense, no action that is in any practical sense "quality" 
is done in isolation. Whether it is the identification of 
the thing or service to produce or provide, the procuring 
of the raw materials, the sustenance required throughout 
the process, or the distribution of the product or 
provision of the service, the Essential Human Capacities 
must be employed for the agent's limited time and effort to 
be productive.
It may happen that an agent will expend time and 
effort in isolation and without employing the Essential 
Human Capacities and create, or do, something of value.
But, this should not be seen to be an essentially human 
act. Thus, where assembly-line workers or riflemen in the 
attack have been deprived of the autonomy to employ their 
Essential Human Capacities or act cooperatively, their acts 
(though they may be of great social value) are not, at that 
time and in that place, essentially human unless it is 
reasonable under the circumstances to defer to the will of 
another.
"As Far As Is Reasonably Possible"
A key qualifying clause in the definitions of the 
Essential Human Judgment Process, Quality Judgment, and 
Quality Action is "As Far As Is Reasonably Possible." This
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clause basically transforms these concepts into 
presumptions. The effect is to treat them as standards 
against which decision-making, policy making, and policy 
implementation are measured, subject always to a reasoned, 
communicable argument as to why the standards should not be 
applied in a particular instance.
For example, let us return to our example of the 
sinking ship. The crew is standing by lifeboats, people 
are climbing into the boats preparing to abandon ship. You 
are running toward the last of the lifeboats when you 
notice two people standing on opposite sides of the ship. 
One is the Captain, who is calmly watching the ship take on 
water, giving every indication that he intends to go down 
with the ship. The other is a person who has quite clearly 
panicked and is frozen with fear.
Here, the lack of time, the gravity of the 
situation, and panic involved would together constitute a 
good argument against meeting the formal requirements of an 
Essentially Human Judgment Process, Quality Judgment, and 
Quality Action as to the person overcome by panic. We 
previously concluded that intervention in the form of 
actually coercing the person into the lifeboat would be 
reasonable. The judgment and action themselves would be 
"quality" under these circumstances because that was all 
that was reasonable under the circumstances.
The Captain's situation, however, is dramatically 
different. Here, he is apparently in full control of his
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capacities and has apparently made a decision in full 
accordance with the customs and traditions of his 
profession. While these customs and traditions may make 
little sense to us, they embody knowledge dating from 
ancient times, presumably reflecting some values that have 
withstood the test of time. Provided the Captain is 
apparently able to exercise his Essential Human Capacities, 
both you and he have met the formal requirements of the 
concepts. It would violate those requirements to disregard 
his will and force him into the lifeboat.
The same analysis holds for public policy issues.
A number of factors, individually or collectively, might 
militate against fully employing the Essential Human 
Capacities of any or all those involved or affected:
1. The gravity of the situation;
2. The lack of time available;
3. Separation in time, such as intergenerational 
issues;
4. Separation in space, such as distance or national 
or natural boundaries;
5. Any deficiencies in the Essential Human Capacities, 
including their poor state of development or 
maintenance, or their impairment, whether through 
passion, greed, etc.;
6. Any conflict in visions or values; and
7. Any conflict in views of reality or expectations.
Whatever the factor or factors involved that are 
deemed to constitute a reasonable argument against meeting 
the formal requirements for employing the essential Human 
Capacities, there is almost never justification for not 
taking into account the impact of the judgment on the 
capacities of all those affected.
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For example, a political decision may be made by 
representatives of the citizenry with their minimal 
involvement in the decision itself. It may be the case 
that a portion of the citizenry participates by lobbying 
the politicians and bureaucrats involved in making policy, 
but the matter is considered too subject-sensitive or too 
time-sensitive to permit further public involvement. To 
the extent that this process reflects the shared vision and 
values of the citizenry, it may be said to have complied 
with the formal requirements of the Essential Human 
Judgment Process and a Quality Judgment. But, it will 
remain the case that the impact of the judgment on those 
affected, over time, may be such that their Essential Human 
Capacities are neither developed nor maintained, at least 
insofar as public judgment is concerned. The impact will 
be particularly detrimental to the development and 
maintenance of the Essential Human Capacities of the 
citizenry if the judgment is a law not in concert with the 
shared visions or values of the citizenry.
Quality Judgment and Quality Action over Time
A significant consequence of employing an 
Essentially Human Judgment Process and engaging in Quality 
Action over time is the habituation of the individual and 
the development of custom among a community. Through the 
exercise of critical and creative thinking and 
communication skills— over time and in supportive
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communities of cooperative inquiry— individuals will 
develop the self-confidence, the self-discipline, the 
maturity, the empathy and the courage to see an ethical or 
policy issue; engage in the thinking and communication 
required to reach Quality Judgment; and act in accordance 
with that judgment. Thus, Quality Judgment and Quality 
Action over time are of the greatest significance for the 
individual and the community.
In sum, humans— through exercising an Essentially 
Human Judgment Process to reach Quality Judgment and 
Quality Action— grow, develop, and reinforce all that which 
is essentially human in themselves and their community. It 
follows from this that, from the perspective of the members 
of a community, any process that does not involve the 
reasonable participation of all persons affected by a 
decision (whether directly or indirectly) employs less 
human capacity than is available, cannot be Quality 
Judgment, and may actually lead to disharmony in a 
community. Moreover, the essentially human involvement of 
the persons affected by a judgment, both in the process and 
the policy, results in Quality Action, which tends to 
generate the necessary community support or consensus 
essential to maintenance of a policy over time and is of 
the essence of democracy.
Thus, the optimal outcome for an essentially human 
judgment process for the community is two-fold. First, 
Quality Judgment is arrived at as informally as possible
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through the reasonable participation of all individuals 
affected, directly and indirectly, through critical and 
creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; 
and cooperating in inquiry and action. Second, the 
original Quality Judgment is implemented through Quality 
Action with autonomous agents employing the Essential Human 
Capacities.
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Chapter Notes/6
1Indeed, T. Alexander Smith (1989) has observed that:
Most policy disputes over the proper role of government 
in the economy are in reality disagreements over the 
long run or the short run. (97)
^See also Yankelovich (1991) as to the time necessary 
to permit the persons involved in the judgment process or 
affected by a judgment to "absorb and accept all the 
consequences of their own views" (118).
3A s to the latter notion, see Spiegel (1974, 38-39); 
see also, Hofstede (1991, Chap. 7).
4Thus, there is a distinction drawn between "rules" 
and "commands" or "policy rules." Rules, which may or may 
not be personally and voluntarily agreed to, tell all 
members of the community what they cannot do, not what they 
must do. Commands or "policy rules" tend to "allocate 
resources of various kinds among selected groups" and 
therefore tell certain persons what they must do."
PART III
IMPLICATIONS, GUIDELINES & APPLICATION 
CHAPTER 7
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES
Policy Implications of the Judgment Process
When a new human being is born, the process of its 
creation has only just begun. Indeed, the most significant 
part of the process may be the two or four years 
immediately ahead as the human child develops her 
consciousness of the world around her and her other 
essential human capacities so that she may consciously 
participate in it.
The implications of the assumptions underlying the 
Essential Interdependence Paradigm, as well the framework 
itself, have enormous policy implications. It can readily 
be seen that it would be irresponsible for parents to bear 
children where they are unable or unwilling to devote the 
time, energy and attention required to provide for the 
existence and energy of the child at a minimum, and, more 
importantly, to develop fully her essential human
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capacities.
The implications of this approach for the debates 
over the significance of the sexual revolution and a return 
to "traditional values," the propriety of contraception and 
abortion, child custody, welfare reform, education, 
humanitarian assistance, and foreign aid to developing 
nations are many, varied, and significant.
For example, any significant devotion of time, 
energy and attention to sexual activity for the sake of
pleasure that is not a part of an activity that is
otherwise "essentially human" must be seen to be neither 
"essentially good" nor "responsible," since the Essential 
Human Capacities have not been employed and the activity 
itself does not lead to their development and maintenance. 
Moreover, even sexual activity that develops, maintains, 
and employs these capacities for one partner is not good to 
the degree that it does not do so for the other.
If there is any substantial potential that a life
may be generated, and the partners know that they are 
neither willing nor able to nurture the child for those 
essential formative years, the sexual activity is not 
essentially responsible unless reasonably adequate 
contraception is used. Since contraception is not fool­
proof at present, only knowing that abortion is an option 
would eliminate the probability that a fetus created would, 
with the passage of time, develop the Essential Human 
Capacities.
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Where good sexual activity results in a potential 
life having an existence in utero, and a part in the 
evolutionary process, it would be presumptively unethical 
to terminate its existence unless there was no 
opportunity— throughout the entire society— for the child 1s 
existence and energy to be maintained and her Essential 
Human Capacities developed, maintained and employed. This 
framework implies that to the extent a society subsidizes 
the abortion of the fetus, without encouraging the adoption 
of the child it would probably have become by willing and 
capable persons, it is neither compassionate nor caring in 
any essentially human sense.
To the extent that parental involvement is required 
for the Essential Human Capacities of the child to be 
developed and maintained, it is irresponsible for the 
parents to pursue their life projects to the detriment of 
the development of the child's capacities. The child, 
after all, has but one chance to develop those capacities 
fully and well. To the extent that it does not value the 
child rearing role of its citizens, workers, and colleagues 
(traditionally women), it is not essentially good, true, or 
beautiful. To the extent that a society discourages this 
devotion of time, energy, and attention, it is not an 
essentially true, good, or beautiful society.
The same logic applies where a society essentially 
subsidizes the birth of children without regard to whether 
their Essential Human Capacities can or will be developed.
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So, where a society subsidizes having children or mandates 
parental leave or day care that cannot substitute for the 
close and personal involvement of the parents, its policies 
are not essentially human and the society cannot be 
essentially good, true, or beautiful. It may espouse the 
importance of children; it may even love its children 
passionately. It may be powerful, cultured, and refined, 
but it is not essentially good, true, or beautiful.
Conversely, where an individual or couple has put 
in the energy, time, and attention to develop the Essential 
Human Capacities, they may be thought to be the "essential 
parents" of the child, having more claim to parenthood than 
those who merely conceived and bore the child. Where 
adopted children are routinely returned to biological 
parents, the society honors the biological parents over the 
essential parents. In so doing, it dishonors the essential 
humanity of the adoptive parents and the child as well.
To the extent that a society's notions of goodness, 
truth, and beauty are commanded or manipulated by a 
government— against the custom and traditions of its people 
and without their active involvement— that society is not 
essentially good, essentially true, or essentially 
beautiful. To the extent that the society glorifies 
coercion and violence over development, maintenance, and 
employment of the Essential Human Capacities, over 
expanding consciousness, choosing and acting, and dealing 
properly with the objects of our compassion, it cannot
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become an essentially good, essentially true, or 
essentially beautiful society.
Finally, to the extent that its system of 
education, whether public or private, develops a citizenry 
that learns through didactic teaching methods that 
encourage data dumps followed by regurgitation of the data 
dumped, the society is not essentially good, essentially 
true, or essentially beautiful. Didactically teaching even 
the truest of skills and knowledge, the best of values, the 
most exquisite of beauty cannot make it an essentially 
true, essentially good, or essentially beautiful society.
A few principles, moreover, are implicit in the 
Essential Interdependence Paradigm:
A. While it is not essential that every person in a 
community participate in an essentially human judgment 
process to reach Quality Judgment, it is essential to 
realize that to the extent members of a community are 
excluded from participation, or are unable to participate, 
the outcome of the process is, to that extent, less than 
optimal.
B. Coercion and compulsion, from whatever source 
(whether from government interference or the violence of 
private individuals) and for whatever reason (however well- 
intentioned), should be seen as distorting the capacity of 
the individual to fully exercise his or her human 
capacities. This adversely affects both the perpetrator 
and the victim.
136
C. In order not to endanger the working of social 
cooperation, the individual must abstain from satisfying 
those desires whose satisfaction would hinder the 
establishment of societal institutions that permit or 
encourage cooperative inquiry and action.
D. All progress within any community is the direct 
result of the continuous development and expansion of its 
members' capacities for cooperative inquiry and cooperative 
action.
E. For any community that is structured or operated in 
such a fashion that judgments affecting the members of that 
community are made without the participation of the members 
affected, the outcome of a process is to that extent less 
than optimal.
F. Policy makers must take into account the "creative 
aspect or dimension" involved in implementing a judgment in 
an inherently uncertain environment and provide that 
whoever implements a judgment must have both the time and 
flexibility necessary to modify, adapt, or terminate the 
judgment as experience suggests.
G. In a community, based upon the division of labor 
and social cooperation, and composed of autonomous 
individuals, solidarity requires clear understanding of the 
community vision, core values, and principles underlying 
the policy and the rules implementing them.
H. Individuals who wish to create the lives they truly 
desire to live must seek to connect with others in a
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community that supports, even applauds, such activity.
I. There can be no ethics or policy experts whose harm 
will not exceed his or her value to a human community to 
the extent that that expertise is not grounded on, and 
within, an essentially human judgment process.
Methodological Guidelines
Definitions
Though the Essential Interdependence Paradigm is a 
priori and conceptual in its origins and presentation, a 
certain degree of objectivity is possible. This measure of 
objectivity is possible not only by considering the amount 
of personal participation in making a judgment, but, the 
kinds and degrees of interpersonal relationships and the 
extent to which persons, in each relationship, are 
employing their Essentially Human Capacities to create the 
lives they truly desire to live. These methodological 
guidelines should be seen as representative, rather than 
comprehensive.
They do, however, suggest opportunities for further 
research. For example, to the extent that critical and 
creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; 
and cooperating in inquiry and action can be objectively 
measured, such measurements can be applied to determining 
their correlation to arriving at Essential Human Truth.
One might, for example, explore the correlation between 
effectiveness, efficiency, and safety and the development,
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maintenance, and employment of the Essential Human 
Capacities in companies that consciously recruit, train, 
educate, and develop its employees with these capacities in 
mind.
Relationships can be characterized as varying along 
two principal dimensions, the formal/informal dimension 
(the kind of relationship) and the personal/impersonal 
dimension (the degree of relationship). Formal 
relationships are those that are "well-defined, limited, in 
ways that are publicly understood and publicly sanctioned" 
(Card 1990, 210). 1 Having such a relationship "facilitates 
control where there would otherwise be a lack of trust or 
simply an inability to predict and plan." A "personal" 
relationship is "when it matters to the parties who the 
other parties are and when this mattering is important to 
the nature of the relationship." Characteristics of 
personal relationships are closeness and intimacy and raise 
issues of attachment and antipathy.2 Informal 
relationships are not necessarily personal, though they are 
"characterized by responsibilities that can facilitate 
relationships of attachment." Being able to estimate the 
formal/informal personal/impersonal dimensions is important 
because formality and impersonality tend to inhibit genuine 
communication between participants, one positively 
antithetical to the notion of community of inquiry, and to 
that degree tends to forestall critical and creative 
thinking particularly in persons occupying the lower rungs
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of a hierarchical organization.
Toward the "Essentially Human"
As human affairs are too complex and subjective for 
the following standards to be precisely measured, the 
following guidelines should not be used for any purpose 
other than as a guide to, or as a presumptive basis for 
estimating, the kind and degree of interpersonal 
relationships in a community; the kind and degree of social 
cooperation; and the kind and degree of essentially human 
activities pursued.
To estimate the degree to which a community, its 
judgment processes, and its policies approach the ideal of 
being essentially human the following steps should be 
taken: first, determine the kind and degree of individual
participation for the pathfinding, problem-solving and 
implementing required; second, determine the quality of 
individual participation in terms of the Essential Human 
Capacities; third, determine the kind and degree of 
interpersonal relationships established and maintained; 
fourth, apply certain presumptive preferences (ceteris 
paribus) as to the kind of participation and interpersonal 
relationships; fifth, apply certain presumptive preferences 
(ceteris paribus) as to the degree of participation and 
interpersonal relationships; sixth, determine the attention 
given to matters of time, time value orientation, time 
frames, and time preferences; and seventh, determine the
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presence or absence of the conditions for Quality Action 
and creativity.
A. As to the degree and kind of individual 
participation and relationships established and maintained:
Ml Arithmetically, determine the number of 
persons involved in or affected by the judgment who (a) 
did not (or were unable) to participate fully in the 
process of arriving at the judgment,3 both path-finding 
and problem-solving, (b) did not have their point of
view considered fully in the process of arriving at the
judgment, or (c) will not be involved fully in the
implementation of the action program.
M2 Any increase in participation by the involved 
or affected population in pathfinding, or making, 
implementing, or evaluating a judgment (or its program) 
is better than no such increase, a lesser increase or a 
decrease.
M3 Any increase in critical and creative 
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and/or 
cooperating in inquiry or action in pathfinding or 
making, implementing, or evaluating of a judgment (or 
its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser 
increase, or a decrease.
B. In comparing the projected outcomes (assuming no 
coercion or fraud), the following presumptive preferences, 
ceteris paribus, apply as to the kind of relationships:4
M4 Arithmetically and geometrically, compare the 
number and kind of relationships by category: (a)
formal and impersonal, (b) formal and personal, (c) 
informal and impersonal; and (d) informal and personal.
M5 A greater number of informal relationships is 
better than a greater number of formal relationships.
M6 A greater number of informal relationships in 
either degree is better than fewer such relationships.
M7 Fewer new formal relationships are better 
than more such relationships.
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M8 Any change in a formal relationship to an
informal relationship is better than the status quo or 
the change of an informal relationship to a formal one.
C. In comparing the projected outcomes, and assuming 
no coercion or fraud, the following presumptive preference, 
ceteris paribus, applies as to the degree of relationships:
M9 A greater number of informal and personal
relationships is better than a greater number of 
informal and impersonal relationships.
D. As to the quality of participation and action 
within interpersonal relationships:
M10 Congruence within individuals and within the 
groups and intergroup between the demands of 
temporality, diversity of values, and institutional 
arrangements must be achieved,6 that is, that any 
meanings, values and norms regarding purposive actions 
under the judgment be objectified or objectifiable in 
the overt behaviors and material vehicles6 of 
individuals and groups.
E. As to time, time frames, and time preferences:
Mil Was adequate time available to make the
judgment?
Ml2 Did the judgment process give as much
consideration to alternatives that take effect later 
rather than sooner, whose expected impacts are 
indirect, and whose benefits occur in the long run?
Ml3 Did the judgment take into account the time
value orientation of all persons involved in making the 
judgment and affected by the judgment?
M14 Was adequate time available to use Quality
Judgment during the implementation phase?
Ml5 Will the individual and/or community 
exercise critical and creative thinking; communicating 
in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and 
action skills over such a period that they will become 
habit for the individual or custom for the community?
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F. As to the possibility of Essential Human Excellence 
(optimal experience):
Ml6 To what degree were all those involved or 
affected engaged in meaningful activity?
Ml7 To what degree did all those involved know 
what must be done?
M18 To what degree are the challenges well- 
matched by abilities of all those involved or affected 
to employ we 11-developed Essential Human Capacities;
Ml9 To what degree were all those involved or 
affected able to balance their challenges against their 
Essential Human Capacities?
M20 To what degree were all those involved or 
affected given the opportunity for concentration and 
involvement ?
M21 To what degree were all those involved or 
affected given sufficient feedback to permit a clear 
vision, an accurate, insightful view of current 
reality, and reasonable expectations of the 
possibilities of future action?
M22 To what degree did all persons involved or 
affected experience a sense that influencing the 
creative process is possible in principle?
G. As to the possibility of creativity:
M23 To what degree are the persons involved or 
affected motivated by the belief that, through his or 
her individual efforts, the world can be changed?
M24 To what degree do the persons involved or 
affected have well-developed Essential Human 
Capacities, a discovery orientation, and intrinsic 
motivation?7
M25 To what degree are the persons involved or 
affected a part of a creative system: Is the main 
concern of the community to preserve or change the 
community? How many variations are the community 
equipped to recognize? What are its resources for 
controlling the rate of individual variations? What 
are its selection criteria concerning new variations?
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What is the status of community relative to other 
communities in the social system? Is the community 
autonomous, made up of persons controlling their own 
destiny, or is it controlled by external institutions?^ 
To what extent is human creativity stifled by the 
control of the community?
Conclusion and Preview
Having detailed a psychological and philosophical 
basis for an Essentially Human Judgment Process, laid out 
the assumptions underlying an Essential Interdependence 
Paradigm, defined and discussed the most important concepts 
included in the framework, described the policy 
implications of the framework, and developed a number of 
methodological guidelines to aid in further inquiry, we are 
now ready to apply the Essentially Human Judgment Process 
to a fact situation, the current dilemma over what policy 
to apply for single-parent welfare.
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Chapter Notes/7
1Institutions are formal; rights are characteristic 
of very formal relationships (Card 1990, 210-11).
^Spousehood is a formally defined status in law which 
nonetheless is characterized by informal and personal 
obligations. So, the relationship is one of mixed formal 
and informal and personal obligations.
The relationship of teacher to student under a didactic 
model is primarily formal and impersonal as the teacher has 
informational authority. The same relationship under a 
community of inquiry model is formal in the sense that the 
teacher has instructional authority, but informal and 
personal in the conduct of the community of inquiry itself.
The relationship of a doctor to a patient is often 
considered informal and personal, but it becomes more 
formal as the patient asserts rights, though it retains 
aspects of the personal.
The relationship of an attorney to his client is 
largely informal and personal, though like marriage, it is 
formal to the extent it is regulated by the state. The 
relationship of judge to a defendant, on the other hand, is 
both formal and impersonal.
Participation of members of the affected population 
should be considered to the degree that each is "informed 
and competent," that is, more weight should be given to 
those adept in the Essential Human Skills.
Accordingly, some participants’ opinions will be 
Quality Judgments accorded great weight. Other 
participants' opinions will be considered "Mere Opinion" 
and given little weight beyond consideration of the fact 
that those indeed were the opinions (possibly only ill- 
considered desires) of those participants at the time and 
in that place.
Time is a factor here because, as members of a 
community are more-or-less informed and/or competent, it 
will be reasonable often to make more time available to 
those capable of making Quality Judgments rather than to 
those capable of only mere opinion.
Note that "informed and competent" in this context does 
not preclude the expert and his or her expertise, but it is 
unlikely that expertise alone, as presently offered and
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used, will rise to being Quality Judgment. The principal 
shortcoming will be that one having such specialized 
knowledge will be less inclined to consider (as far as 
reasonably possible) the points of view of those of the 
affected population and will have concentrated on acquiring 
some knowledge to the exclusion of all other (see, e.g., 
Saul 1992; Formaini 1990; McCollough 1991, 3, 5, 61, 82-4).
4As all progress within any community is the direct 
result of the continuous development and expansion of its 
members1 capacities for cooperative inquiry and cooperative 
action, it is possible to establish normative standards to 
guide policy formulation and evaluation.
5Called "cultural congruence" (T. Smith 1988, 206,
207).
®For example, the stated norm or value of "empowering 
employees" would not be integrated with behaviors and 
material vehicles, if management did not behave as though 
employees actually had power or provide them with the 
material vehicles, e.g., access, tools, computers, 
communications equipment, communities of cooperative 
inquiry, etc. for employees to actually act autonomously, 
cooperatively, and constructively.
7Csikszentmihalyi discusses the relationship between 
personality traits and values, cognitive orientation toward 
discovery, and intrinsic motivation in "The Domain of 
Creativity," Chap. in Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and 
Gardner 1994.
^Compare Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner 
(1994, 152) with Jackall (1983, 118-30).
CHAPTER 8
APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION
Application of the Framework and 
Methodological Guidelines
By way of example, let us turn to a simple fact 
situation that illustrates the much larger social problem 
of "the impoverished single-parent." Using the Essential 
Interdependence Paradigm, especially its Essentially Human 
Judgment Process, I will evaluate the effects of a decision 
to institute a program similar to Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children.
This situation is chosen because of its currency 
and its importance to our society. Charles Murray, in a 
1993 article in the Wall Street Journal, developed the 
significance of this problem. He observed that, in 1991,
1.2 million children were born to unmarried mothers, nearly 
30 percent of all births. Murray noted that this 
percentage is four percentage points higher than the black 
illegitimacy rate in the early 1960s that prompted national 
concern. With the national percentage at 30 percent and 
the overall white illegitimacy rate at 22 percent, Murray 
concludes that not only had the public policy problem of
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providing support to the unwed single mother become a
bigger problem, but that it was spreading to the dominant
white middle class from the marginalized black underclass.
Murray (1993) argues that:
My proposition is that illegitimacy is the single most 
important social problem of our time— more important 
than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare or 
homelessness because it drives everything else. Doing 
something about it is not just one more item on the 
American policy agenda, but should be on top. (A14)
We will take as given that the single parent in our
case should not, as a matter of public policy, receive from
all sources, including the government, less than $10,000.00
per year in order to adequately care for her child or
children. Each guideline will be set forth followed by
discussion of its application to the problem presented.
Ml Arithmetically, determine the number of persons 
involved in or affected by the judgment who (a) did not 
(or were unable) to participate fully in the process of 
arriving at the judgment,1 both path-finding and 
problem-solving, (b) did not have their point of view 
considered fully in the process of arriving at the 
judgment, or (c) will not be involved fully in the 
implementation of the action program.
Discussion: Pre-program, the typical single-parent is a
woman, usually under-educated, and if employed, unable to
make $10,000 per year. She uses modestly well-developed
critical and creative thinking skills, communication skills
and cooperation skills in eking out an existence for
herself and her child. She deals with an employer who is
unable or unwilling to pay her $10,000.00 per year. She
periodically has to approach charitable organizations or
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her church and plead her case for why she should receive 
assistance. She occasionally turns to her parents or 
siblings for assistance who insist upon some accounting for 
the use of the funds. She occasionally gets support from 
the father of the child or children. She occasionally gets 
support from a lover or friends. In the end, however, she 
does not receive the needed $10,000.00 per year.
When the judgment process is followed to initiate 
the AFDC Program, none of the people described above are 
involved in the decision, except to the extent they had 
voted for their members of Congress. Their individual and 
community visions of what is a good life are not 
considered, except very indirectly, and their individual 
and community values, other than survival, are not 
considered, except through representation. Even this 
representation may not truly reflect the people involved or 
affected by the program, since it may have been authorized 
through manipulation in the political process, political 
advertising, speeches, and literature. There is no 
opportunity for innovation on the part of most of the 
participants, whether the bureaucrats or the recipients.
After the program is initiated, none of the people 
mentioned above participates in making the decision about 
whether or not she should receive assistance, to what ends, 
how much, for how long, or under what other conditions. 
Finally, none of the persons mentioned above are involved 
in implementing the program as a new bureaucracy has been
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established, with a full set of implementing rules, which 
do not require critical and creative thinking; 
communicating in symbols and concepts; or cooperating in 
inquiry and action. Indeed, it is illegal for her to 
violate restrictions on receiving support from others so 
long as she receives program funds.
For our single parent to apply, she needs to 
communicate only in terms of description, that is she 
merely describes her status. There may be some 
communicating in symbols and concepts, but, for the most 
part, she needs only to describe her situation. Moreover, 
the bureaucrat's work is not characterized by use the 
Essential Human Capacities to make a decision. His or her 
discretion is limited essentially to matching the 
applicant's description to the requirements of the rules, 
though there is some evaluation as to the credibility of 
her description.
M2 Any increase in participation by the involved or 
affected population in path-finding, or making, 
implementing, or evaluating a judgment (or its program) 
is better than no such increase, a lesser increase or a 
decrease.
Discussion: We see from the description in Ml that there
is significantly less "essentially human" activity after 
the program. To the extent that the single-parent receives 
the $10,000.00 from the government, she no longer deals 
with her employer; she no longer has to plead her case at a 
charity; she no longer has to appeal to her family; and she
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is less dependent upon the father of the children.
Moreover, she is able to have additional children through 
other lovers and receive more money through merely 
describing the fact that she now has one additional child. 
Moreover, assuming that the bureaucrat had used his or her 
Essential Human Capacities before landing his or her AFDC 
job, that person is now acting in far less of an 
"Essentially Human" capacity.
Under the M2 guideline, the situation is 
significantly less "essentially human." The consequences 
are more severe, however. The charity's role, which has 
now been largely supplanted by the government, had formerly 
made appeals to other persons for funds. Since these 
appeals were voluntary, they used their Essential Human 
Capacities to describe the social problem, show how that 
charity could help, and argue why it would be in the 
interests of contributors to assist. It is true that this 
frequently was persuasion rather than a community of 
inquiry, however, none of these capacities are required now 
to be used for this purpose. The government program does 
not need persuasion to accumulate the funds. By the same 
token, the contributors, who used to use the Essential 
Human Capacities to decide whether the problem was as the 
charity described and whether they should contribute their 
own assets to that charity toward solving that problem, now 
either no longer use the Essential Human Capacities or use 
them to avoid paying the taxes used for the AFDC Program.
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Further, the impact on the child is problematical. 
If one follows George Herbert Mead and Jurgen Habermas as 
to the social aspect of development of consciousness, it 
may be that the child has been deprived of exposure to 
well-developed and employed Essential Human Capacities, 
unless the program provides for such exposure. This may be 
why the 25 percent threshold of illegitimacy among the 
white majority, which Charles Murray pointed to, is so 
significant. It may be that that high a percentage 
portends a community that makes such exposure for its 
children problematic.
M3 Any increase in critical and creative thinking; 
communicating in symbols and concepts; and/or 
cooperating in inquiry or action in pathfinding or 
making, implementing, or evaluating of a judgment (or 
its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser 
increase, or a decrease.
Discussion: Under this guideline, though the goal
assisting the children may be admirable, the program as
described is not "essentially human."
M4 Arithmetically and geometrically, compare the 
number and kind of relationships by category: (a)
formal and impersonal, (b) informal and impersonal; and 
(c) informal and personal.
Discussion: We may summarize here by noting that, though
the relationships that existed pre-program did not generate
the $10,000.00, they were largely informal and usually
personal. Post-program the relationships that generated
the funds, both from the point of view of the government
vis a vis the taxpayer and the single-parent vis a vis the
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government are formal and impersonal.
M5 A greater number of informal relationships is 
better than a greater number of formal relationships
Discussion: The program fails this guideline.
M6 A greater number of informal relationships in 
either degree is better than fewer such relationships.
Discussion: The program fails this guideline.
M7 Fewer new formal relationships are better than more 
such relationships.
Discussion: The Program fails this guideline.
M8 Any change in a formal relationship to an informal 
relationship is better than the status quo or the 
change of an informal relationship to a formal one.
Discussion: The program fails this guideline.
M9 A greater number of informal and personal 
relationships is better than a greater number of 
informal and impersonal relationships.
Discussion: The program fails this guideline.
Of the remaining guidelines, it is enough if we
discuss them together, with emphasis on guideline, M15.
Ml5 Will the individual and/or community exercise 
critical and creative thinking; communicating in 
symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and 
action skills over such a period that they will become 
habit for the individual or custom for the community?
Discussion: Here, suffice it to say, if Aristotle is
right— that a person becomes what his or her habits are,
and a community becomes what the customs and traditions of
its members are— then the AFDC program should not bode well
for a community having a large portion of its members
dependent upon it. As to the transfer of the $10,000.00
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itself, significantly less employment of the Essential 
Human Capacities is in evidence, from a purely objective 
point of view, in the affected community. As the single­
parent is transformed from an employee, and even as a 
supplicant, to a case file, she uses significantly fewer of 
her Essential Human Capacities than she would have before. 
The employer, family, friends and lovers are no longer 
involved. The charity that could every day redefine its 
vision of the community it desired to serve was replaced by 
laws and rules and constituencies of service providers 
changeable only thorough the political process. The 
contributors were replaced by taxpayers.
The system is essentially rules-following and 
bureaucratic, hence, it has little room for creativity or a 
sense of the possibility of control. Indeed, the very 
nature of the system, one of entitlement, however well- 
intentioned, does not tap the intrinsic motivation and use 
of the Essential Human Capacities that the Essential 
Interdependence Paradigm suggests is required if a system 
is to be "essentially human."
This is not to say that the conclusion to be drawn 
is that the end served by AFDC is wrong, or even that AFDC 
is a poor program. Assuming that the goal of having each 
such parent receive $10,000.00 per year is otherwise 
appropriate; the program is feasible and suitable; and the 
cost is acceptable, it is, in its processes and its 
policies, not "essentially human."
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It is true that as the single-parent problem is 
identified, discussed, debated, and solved, certain members 
of the community become more involved and employ their 
Essential Human Capacities. Thus, from a utilitarian 
perspective, "the greatest good for the greatest number," 
the Essential Human Capacities, on balance, are employed 
and the impact of the process and judgment on their 
capacities considered. It would, nonetheless, remain true 
that such a program would still not be essentially human 
from the perspectives of those most involved or affected at 
the time and place of the judgment's most immediate impact.
Indeed, in its final effects, the community 
"served" is deprived of even the compassion presumably 
represented by the program. That is, until it happens that 
human beings come to love paying taxes and dealing with 
bureaucrats, the informal and personal involvement of 
autonomous, cooperating human beings that is the goal of 
the Essential Interdependence Paradigm cannot be reached by 
a program similar to AFDC.
An Essentially Human Welfare Policy
The purpose of this thesis was only to develop and 
propose a framework that would support or enclose the far 
richer frames of reference that are essential parts of the 
way we live in society. To propose a solution in this case 
requires a more comprehensive frame of reference. The 
framework proposed by this thesis works only as a skeletal
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structure designed to support and/or enclose something more 
comprehensive. A frame of reference does more: it is a 
structure of views of reality; symbols and concepts, and 
valuations and values by means of which an individual or 
group perceives or evaluates data, communicates ideas, and 
regulates behavior. A frame of reference builds upon, or 
is contained by, a framework.
However, the framework developed herein does 
suggest the essentially human process, structures, and 
systems for a community to follow to arrive at a solution, 
though it cannot suggest the solution itself. Just as 
following the methodological guidelines suggested that the 
AFDC was essentially dehumanizing, the framework suggests a 
process that would mitigate that result or be essentially 
humanizing.
Community Consciousness and Compassion Centers
For the process and solution to be essentially 
human, community involvement in solving our single-parent’s 
problem would revolve around established centers, based in 
neighborhoods or communities within the broader community. 
One is tempted to call these centers "resource centers," 
but they are much more than that. They are community 
centers that will facilitate the involvement of the 
community in solving community welfare problems. Their 
motto might be, "To Understand is To Care." As such, their 
function is to solve such problems through raising the
156
consciousness of the community and providing the 
opportunity for the exercise of community compassion, so 
that individuals, groups, and communities might make more 
effective, efficient, and safe choices for action and 
argument. Hence, something akin to "Community 
Consciousness and Compassion Centers" (C-* Centers) conveys 
their sense (see also Gott 1995).2 The area they serve 
would be the modern day equivalent meeting the Aristotelian 
admonition that the polls should not extend beyond the 
herald's call (Politics 7.4.1326a6-b26). Technology may 
have increased that area, or it may remain much the same. 
This would be a fruitful topic for research.
The solution to the problem raised by this thesis 
would be approached by the community in three phases and be 
part of a larger community initiative (see Carpenter 1991; 
Folger 1991; Van Slyck and Stern 1991; Woolpert 1991), only 
one of which would be visible to point our single-parent 
enters this story.
Phase I includes the devolution of welfare policy 
to the community and the integration of the community's 
public agencies and private organizations to identify the 
full welfare services spectrum of support required in the 
community. Since the Federal government has greatly 
increased its welfare role since the 1960s (Rein 1974), and 
the private sector has not provided such services across 
the full welfare services spectrum (Katz 1984), present 
welfare policy would continue in this phase.
157
Initially, the government function would continue 
its welfare role while actively involving more and more of 
the community as possible while preparing its own employees 
and unions through education and attrition for the changes 
ahead. Social work degree curricula would begin to change 
to reflect the new vision, values, and notions of 
excellence of social welfare. Federal, state, and local 
governments would enact laws and regulations initiating and 
enabling the transition. The community would establish 
inter-agency/organization steering committees.
Government agencies would sponsor, facilitate, and 
participate in communities of inquiry of those involved or 
affected by the community's welfare requirements. Their 
purpose would be to determine what spectrum of welfare 
services the community requires. Their goal would be 
reaching Quality Public Judgments as to what services the 
community requires, yet are not delivered by government 
agency or private organization. Later the government would 
sponsor, facilitate, and participate in communities of 
inquiry tasked to determine how to further encourage the 
community, through privatization or "volunteerization," to 
assume all or some of the welfare services the government 
provides.
As a matter of policy, agencies and organizations 
would see problems, conflict and failure as opportunities 
for learning and growth. This notion would be embedded in 
agency and organization purpose, vision, and mission
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statements. Methods of learning from services rendered 
would be developed as well as the means to distribute the 
skills, knowledge, or understanding derived from experience 
to the community as a whole.
Phase I would require a change in tax policy 
reducing Federal taxes and increasing state or local taxes 
or voluntary contributions. In the transition, Federal tax 
policy might increase the charitable deduction to increase 
contributions to community-based non-profit organizations. 
Federal welfare policy would include funding for community 
conversion efforts, that is, privatization and/or 
volunteerization. Other essentially human initiatives 
would begin in parallel: community mediation programs for 
public policy issues, neighborhood mediation centers for 
dispute resolution, peer mediation for conflicts in the 
schools, vietim-offender reconciliation programs, and 
public education pursued through expanded use of the 
community of inquiry described. (Private education would 
be persuaded to do likewise.) The goal of all these 
initiatives would be to have action and argument in the 
community conducted in an "essentially human" manner as a 
matter of individual habit and community custom and 
tradition.
Phase II would be devoted to the communities 
developing Centers: building the facilities, training 
facilitators to staff them, developing systems and 
structures to insure community agency interoperability, and
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implementing the changes. Community participation would be 
the norm: local materials, architecture, art, steering 
committees, communications, and people would be employed as 
much as possible to encourage the community involvement 
theme.
Community meetings would be continuous throughout 
this phase. The community would organize and/or develop 
non-profit organizations to meet requirements of the full 
welfare services spectrum. Their purpose, vision, and 
mission statements would be developed or adapted to reflect 
clearly their role in meeting the community's needs. Their 
structures, strategies and systems would be developed or 
adapted to meet those needs. Their organizational frames 
of reference would expressly include cooperation in inquiry 
and action with other community agencies and organizations 
to meet community needs.
Learning from services offered would be an 
objective of all agencies and organizations. Formally 
educating the public as to the vision, values, and notions 
of excellence embodied in the C3 Centers would begin in 
this phase. Communications systems between community 
agencies and organizations would be put in place.
Integrated triage and hand-off procedures from one agency 
or organization to another would be developed and 
exercised. Assessment of community requirements would be 
continuous.
Phase III would be where our single parent enters
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the program. The C3 Centers, as far as can be reasonably 
projected, would be operated by the government or under 
government contract. The Centers would have on-site triage 
personnel to identify immediate needs and prioritize 
available resources. In an emergency, triage personnel 
could waive health and safety measures, such as the number 
of people to a room, the qualifications of day care 
personnel, or surge housing in temporary over-flow 
buildings that do not meet Federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act requirements— provided it was a Quality 
Judgment. Representatives, or points of contact, for all 
community agencies and organizations across the full 
welfare services spectrum would be available through open 
lines of communication.
The following steps would be taken, to a greater or 
lesser degree, depending upon the context of the 
applicant's problem. Since the precise nature of each 
applicant's problem is as varied as the persons involved 
and affected, the first step is the definition of the 
problem before proceeding to develop a process to find a 
solution or involve the persons affected. If one defines a 
problem as a gap between a desired future and current 
reality where there is no reasonable expectation that human 
action will bridge the gap, this would require an 
understanding of the visions, views of reality, and 
expectations of all those involved and affected. Using the 
methodological guides to identify those involved and
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affected and the character of their relationships to the 
applicant, the facilitator would develop a history of the 
applicant and her involvement in the community, help the 
community sort out critical issues, identify persons 
involved or affected, and gain a sense of what the process 
might involve. At the same time, the facilitator would 
educate those involved or affected by the problem about the 
Center's role, establish credibility, and encourage 
participation in the process of finding and implementing a 
solution.
The facilitator would work with those involved and 
affected to design and set up a process for productive 
discussions. She would work with them to define a problem 
in a way that all parties can accept as something to work 
together to solve, determine necessary roles and identify 
who should fill them, suggest a process frame of reference, 
establish a plan of action and milestones for the process, 
help those involved source resources to pursue the process, 
and integrate the possible solutions offered by 
participants. A steering committee drawn from those 
involved and affected might be selected. A resource group 
of professionals with expertise in the economic, social, 
psychological, political, and legal aspects of the 
applicant's situation would be identified and the logistics 
of their availability arranged.
Many of these situations will be routine or 
typical, so that few complex issues will be raised and
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procedures will be fairly standardized. However, there may 
be larger community issues raised by the specific problem 
of the applicant. For example, the employer may argue that 
the applicant is not productive enough to justify a higher 
wage. If found to be true, education officials may be 
approached to see if some course of study should be 
developed or modified in some respect. So, initial 
sessions might deal with major issues raised during the 
interviews, but will always deal with process objectives.
In any event, even if considered routine, the problem is 
still defined and the process selected relative to that 
applicant, rather than according to some centralized 
bureaucracy's notion of what the process should look like.
The participants might agree to have an expert 
participate and she, or one of the lay participants, might 
write a paper addressing issues raised by the participants. 
The resource group would be reasonably available for 
technical data research, conceptual development, or 
assistance in surfacing valuations and values during the 
process.
Early in the process, a plan of action and 
milestones tied to specific goals and objectives should 
emerge as a living document; revision would be continuous. 
Until the problem is resolved, dialogue and discussion 
would continue in plenary sessions, caucus meetings, and 
work group sessions. The caucuses would allow involved 
parties to discuss issues and possible revisions to the
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program alone with the facilitator. A working group, drawn 
from the steering committee and resource group, might be 
created to facilitate resolution of problems that are 
shared by multiple persons.
Persons who would almost certainly be invited to 
participate are the parents of the child; the extended 
family; church and education representatives; employer(s); 
and a representative of the community agencies and 
organizations administering available funds. Under some 
circumstances, the child herself, or a representative or 
guardian ad litem, might be involved to fully garner all 
relevant perspectives.
Agency and organization representatives would be 
empowered to authorize the expenditure of funds in a manner 
tailored to the needs of the applicant with minimal 
reference to the sourcing agency or organization. He or 
she would be guided by broad principles reflecting the 
shared vision, values, and notions of excellence of the 
community and the agency or organization. The sources of 
the funds controlled by the community representative(s) 
would be the community itself; there would be no outside 
source to solve that which is considered a community 
problem.
The program itself would balance the vision, 
values, and notions of excellence of the community in the 
long-run with the essential humanity of the child and 
parents. Here is where the solution cannot be pursued
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further with certainty. In our present communities, our 
vision, values, and notions of excellence do not truly 
support the fullest development of the essential human 
capacities of our children, as the norm is for both parents 
to work relatively soon after a child is born. The child 
is frequently left with a day care provider or in a day 
care center. Unless the community shares the assumption 
that the parents, presumptively, are the persons best 
situated to develop the Essential Human Capacities of the 
child, the program would not likely provide for the mother 
to stay home and raise her child for the two or three years 
that most experts agree is the essentially formative period 
in the child's life.
However, in a society where its vision, values, and 
notions of excellence include the fullest development of 
the essential human capacities— and the community shares 
the assumption that the parents, presumptively, are the 
persons best situated to develop the Essential Human 
Capacities of the child— the program would support such 
development. However, this is a rebuttable presumption.
If the parents are incapable or unwilling of developing the 
child's Essential Human Capacities, such facilitation, 
persuasion, manipulation, or coercion as would be required, 
or appropriate (given the vision, values, and notions of 
excellence of the community) would be applied to insure 
that the child's capacities are so developed. It would be 
irresponsible, as a matter of public policy, to merely
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support the existence of a parent and child where it was 
known that the parents were unwilling or incapable of 
developing the child's Essential Human Capacities.
Where appropriate, the program would provide for 
both the child's and the parents' development. Where even 
coercion fails to lead to the development of the child's 
capacities, the child would be considered endangered in an 
essentially human sense and removed from the biological 
parents. If required and available, foster parents for the 
child would be found relatively early in her life. If 
enough time passed that the foster parents became the 
child's essentially human parents, then they would be 
allowed to adopt the child to the exclusion of the 
biological parents. Biological parenting would not take 
priority over essential human parenting.
At various steps along the way, participants would 
describe what they have learned through the process. As 
the late Rear Admiral Jay Proust used to say, "Written out 
is thought out." So, these descriptions would be recorded 
and would be included in a lessons-learned library, similar 
to legal appellate court decisions. There would be walls 
of bookcases with bound reports of lessons-learned from 
involved or affected persons. Eventually they would be 
catalogued, digested, and have a citation system developed 
so that they could be readily referenced and valuable 
lessons would not be lost to the community.
The problem in our instant situation might be
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resolved through skills enhancement or negotiation skills 
training; a facilitator may assist her in pleading her case 
for a raise; job counseling may find a situation paying 
more; an agency may supplement her wage during the 
foregoing efforts, or indefinitely; financial management 
may be provided to help her reduce her expenses; 
cooperative arrangements might be made to reduce expenses 
or improve the quality of her life (e.g., car pooling); or 
the community may weigh on the father, family, or church 
for support.
Such a relatively rule-free program would be 
subject to abuse, of course. For example, a wage 
supplement could operate as unfair competition for rivals 
to the employer who do not receive what is, in effect, a 
wage subsidy. But, in an environment where argument and 
action are based upon well-developed, maintained, and 
employed or facilitated Essential Human Capacities, those 
involved or affected would be expected to participate in a 
community of inquiry to resolve the problems of a member of 
the community.
If the process were to be pursued in this manner, 
as an isolated program, abuse would probably be the norm. 
But in an environment where other initiatives are likewise 
on-going— community mediation programs for public policy 
issues, neighborhood mediation centers for dispute 
resolution, peer mediation for conflicts in the schools, 
victim-offender reconciliation programs, and public
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education pursued through expanded use of the community of 
inquiry— abuse should be reduced. Where Quality Judgment 
is an individual habit and community custom and tradition, 
abuse should be reduced still further. In any event, the 
marginal cost of paying for tailored solutions that involve 
the members of the community in solving community problems 
should be less over the long-term than current programs 
that have less flexibility in remedies.
Prospects for Successful Implementation
The advantages of this process are numerous, though 
the problems with it are probably insurmountable in the 
present environment. Nonetheless, it is a valuable 
exercise because it highlights just how flawed our present 
society and its programs are in this area.
First, as an advantage, this process involves all 
those affected, if they are willing to be involved. Its 
disadvantage, in our present environment, is that it is 
probable that many of those affected would not be willing 
to participate and the process would not have the multiple 
perspectives required to achieve Essential Human Truth. 
Second, as an advantage, it tailors a solution to the 
vision, values, and notions of excellence of the 
participants and the community and employs the 
participant's Essential Human Capacities. Its disadvantage 
is that, in the present environment, there will be little 
such vision, values, and notions of excellence shared by
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the participants and the community. Thus, the community 
may come to see its resources as misused or wasted. Third, 
as an advantage, the government agency bureaucrats would be 
empowered to make a judgment based upon their own Quality 
Judgment— judgments based upon the well-formed visions, 
values, and notions of excellence of the participants and 
the community. Its disadvantage is that the process would 
consume more time, would produce results in different cases 
that might appear to be inconsistent to outside observers, 
and might invite corruption or be otherwise abused.
Finally, as an advantage, the resources would be 
contributed by the members of the community to meet the 
community’s vision, values, and notions of excellence such 
that they would actually have contributed to the welfare of 
their own community. Thus, this should increase the sense 
of involvement in, understanding of, and responsibility for 
the good of the community among its members. The 
disadvantages are that the moneys might still be the 
product of coercion in the form of taxation unless they 
were truly voluntary contributions, in which case some 
citizens may not make a reasonable contribution, breeding 
resentment. There could be no national standard in any 
event. Further, some reasonable limits to proselytizing of 
agency or organization vision, values, and notions of 
excellence would have to be imposed.
As I write this, every instinct screams that such a 
program is not practical. So, why propose it? The
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perfectly reasonable question in reply is, if it is not 
practical, why not? And, if not, what does that tell us 
about present programs?
If we have agreed that consciousness and compassion 
are fundamental to the choices that lead to action and 
argument, why would we not make important choices such as 
these at some sort of community-based consciousness and 
compassion centers? If we understand the problems of a 
member of our community, why would we not care? If we 
care, would we not learn from that understanding? If we 
believe our communities and the lives of our children are 
important, why could we not find the time or resources to 
be involved in the welfare of our own communities?
If we do not have the time or resources to care 
voluntarily for the disadvantaged among us, how can we 
believe that we live in a community that is good and true 
and beautiful? If we, as a community, do not have shared 
visions, values, and notions of excellence, what do we 
believe is binding our communities together? If we cannot 
trust our "public servants" to make Quality Judgments in 
such matters, why do we believe that rules-bound 
bureaucrats can make the choices any better? If we cannot 
entrust the politicians and bureaucrats with these matters, 
what matters "should we entrust to them? Nuclear weapons 
testing? Nuclear waste disposal and storage? Our 
retirement income and health care? Finally, if the 
individual communities are not willing to contribute or be
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taxed to care for the disadvantaged, why should there be a 
national standard to maintain a community that is not 
willing or able to care for its members?
Our present welfare system begs these questions.
If on analysis, this approach seems to be too impracticable 
and what has been demonstrated to be an essentially 
dehumanizing approach (AFDC and its kindred programs, or 
some variation thereof) is preferable, then this speaks 
volumes about our view of human nature, how we see 
ourselves, and how we see our communities: either our view 
of human nature is such that a good, true, and beautiful 
community is not even theoretically possible; or we have no 
shared vision; values, or notions of excellence sufficient 
to support an essential human welfare policy. If either is 
the case, then welfare policy in our nation stands less as 
an aspect of choice as a function of consciousness and 
compassion than as an exercise in power and crowd control.
There may, perhaps, be a more simple answer. 
Perhaps the answer is simply that welfare policy cannot be 
essentially human unless it is community-based merely for 
epistemological reasons. It may that we cannot otherwise 
know each other well enough to understand each other, to 
have insight into one another's problems, and, ultimately, 
to care. As Aristotle noted in the Politics over two 
thousand years ago:
in order to decide questions of justice and in order to 
distribute offices according to merit it is necessary
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for the citizens to know each other's personal 
characters, since where this does not happen to be the 
case the business of electing officials and trying law­
suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is 
unjust in both matters, and this must obviously prevail 
in an excessively numerous community. ( 7.4.1326bl4-21; 
see also Schollmeier 1994, 109-10)
Then again, as Robert Frost wrote: "Good fences make good
neighbors." This framework cannot provide the complete
answers, but it does raise the essential questions and
suggests the process, structure, and systems required to
answer them.
Conclusion and New Beginning
We have taken a journey from a description of the 
current state of ethics and policy studies through a 
discussion of the nature and severity of the problem and 
then developed a new framework for approaching ethics and 
policy studies based upon the Essential Human Capacities of 
critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols 
and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. We 
have implemented these capacities through an Essentially 
Human Judgment Process that requires that the Essential 
Human Capacities of all involved or affected be used, or 
facilitated, and the impact of the judgment upon those 
capacities taken into account. We have explored what 
Quality Judgment and Quality Action within an Essential 
Interdependence Paradigm would look like. We have 
connsidered a number of policy implications derived from 
the judgment process itself and a number of relatively
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objective guidelines for judgment making, implementing, and 
evaluating.
Finally, having applied the guidelines to perhaps 
the most pressing issue of the day, we have found the 
existing programs to be essentially dehumanizing and have 
developed a concept of the Community Consciousness and 
Compasion Center as a process, structure, and system 
suggested by the framework itself. However, as this 
framework requires, even principles derived through the 
framework itself, if they are to be Quality Judgments, must 
be open to reexamination involving the whole community in 
cooperative inquiry.
This approach, then, goes beyond deontology, which 
looks at what duty we might have as we know the world 
today, to looking toward the implications of today's acts 
for the world of tomorrow. It goes beyond what can now be 
seen as a superficial consequentialism by looking at the 
type of world a policy would create, rather than what 
current problems a policy would solve. It goes beyond 
Friedrich Nietzsche (who went beyond good and evil) by 
seeing participation in life with others to be an integral 
part of living and an essential adjunct to a will to power. 
Moreover, it retains the burden of decision, for powerful 
epistemological reasons, on each of us as individuals 
because no single individual or group of individuals could 
have the essential human knowledge required to develop and 
maintain the essential human capacities of all those
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affected.
This approach is not mandatory, of course. All 
persons have the power to choose among competing theories. 
However, an Essential Interdependence Paradigm places the 
burden of proof on the proponent to articulate what 
consistent principle she is applying in taking actions that 
are not essentially human. Thus, a person working within 
the Essential Interdependence Paradigm would be ethically 
free to follow any particular course in life, provided she 
could explain what principle, consistent with that 
framework, she is following in not respecting the 
development, maintenance, and employment of the Essential 
Human Capacities of all those involved or affected.
It is my hope that this thesis developed a 
framework that may aid in a coming to public judgment 
through inquiry and reflection, discussion and dialogue 
that develops, maintains, and employs that which is most 
essentially human in us all: critical and creative 
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and 
cooperating in inquiry and action. Our resulting frames of 
reference should be richer, and serve us better, in 
creating the lives we truly desire to live.
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Chapter Notes/8
^-Participation of members of the affected population 
should be considered to the degree that each is "informed 
and competent," that is, more weight should be given to 
those adept in the skills that implement the Essential 
Human Capacities.
Accordingly, some participants' opinions will be 
Quality Judgments accorded great weight. Other 
participants' opinions will be considered "Mere Opinion" 
and given little weight beyond consideration of the fact 
that those were the opinions, possibly only ill-considered 
desires, of those participants at the time and in that 
place.
Time is a factor here because, as members of a 
community are more-or-less informed and/or competent, it 
will be reasonable often to make more time available to 
those capable of making Quality Judgments rather than to 
those capable of only mere opinion.
Note that "informed and competent" in this context does 
not preclude the expert and his or her expertise, but it is 
unlikely that expertise as presently offered and used will 
rise to being Quality Judgment. The principal shortcoming 
will be that one having such specialized knowledge will be 
less inclined to consider (as far as reasonably possible) 
the points of view of those of the affected population and 
will have concentrated on acquiring some knowledge to the 
exclusion of all other (see, e.g., Saul 1992; Formaini 
1990; McCollough 1991).
related idea in the public policy arena are 
"neighborhood environmental justice centers," which would 
be part of what one writer styles "an emancipatory justice 
strategy" (see Gott 1995, chap. 7).
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